The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

June 2015

From Armbands to Douchbags: How Doninger v.
Niehoff Shows the Supreme Court Needs to
Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age
Allison E. Hayes

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
Recommended Citation
Hayes, Allison E. (2010) "From Armbands to Douchbags: How Doninger v. Niehoff Shows the Supreme Court
Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age," Akron Law Review: Vol. 43 : Iss. 1 , Article 7.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Hayes: From Armbands to Douchbags

FINAL HAYES_MACRO_FINAL FROM EMAIL 1.11.10.DOC

1/25/2010 2:34 PM

FROM ARMBANDS TO DOUCHEBAGS: HOW DONINGER V.
NIEHOFF SHOWS THE SUPREME COURT NEEDS TO
ADDRESS STUDENT SPEECH IN THE CYBER AGE
Allison E. Hayes*

I. Introduction ...................................................................... 247
II. Background ....................................................................... 249
A. The Supreme Court and the First Amendment in
Public Schools............................................................. 250
B. The Lower Courts’ Attempts at Creating a
Workable Standard for Student Speech Originating
on the Internet ............................................................. 256
III. Statement of the Case ...................................................... 262
A. Statement of the Facts ................................................. 262
B. Competing Arguments ................................................ 266
C. Procedural History ...................................................... 267
IV. Analysis ............................................................................. 271
A. The Doninger Courts Misinterpreted Supreme
Court Precedent........................................................... 271
B. The Doninger Courts Distinguished Their Rulings
from Patterns Evolving in Lower Courts .................... 280
C. Recommendations for a More Workable Standard..... 284
V. Conclusion ......................................................................... 288
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has revolutionized communication, allowing
people to converse instantaneously at the click of a button. Young
people are beginning to use the Internet with a greater frequency and
at a younger age. 1 A 2005 poll showed that 87 percent of kids aged
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12-17 use the Internet.2 This speech-enhancing medium has led to
numerous controversies, causing its regulation to become a
flashpoint in First Amendment jurisprudence. The rising use of the
Internet has presented a critical First Amendment question unique to
public schools: When, if ever, may school administrators punish
students for the content of their online speech? Most student blog
posts create no First Amendment problems. However, student
speech that solicits hitmen, makes vicious character assassinations,
portrays homicidal graphic icons, proposes murder missions, and
creates mock obituaries plague the online world.3
Some
administrators, in search of guidance in this new area of law, have
been lulled into inaction; others have silenced student speech
occurring outside school grounds.4 What we do know, as discussed
infra, is that there are more questions than answers in this emerging
area of law.
Part II of this Note discusses the background of First
Amendment student speech cases as decided by the Supreme Court
as well as a unique classification of lower court holdings.5 Part III
focuses on Doninger v. Niehoff in detail, including the underlying
facts, competing arguments, procedural history, and the District of
Connecticut’s and Second Circuit’s rationale.6 Part IV analyzes why
this case was wrongly decided and argues that the Supreme Court
needs to offer more guidance to lower courts so they may apply a
more consistent standard in student speech cases.7 Further, it

gratitude; to my parents for never getting too mad at me for exercising my own freedom of speech;
finally, I thank the Akron Law Review staff for all their hard work – any mistakes are mine alone.
1. See Emily Nussbaum, Kids, the Internet, and the End of Privacy: The Greatest
Generation Gap Since Rock and Roll, Feb. 2007, at 2, available at http://nymag.com/news/
features/27341 (suggesting that Internet use in the younger generation comes easier to them than it
does an older generation).
2. Pew Internet & American Life Project, Teens and Technology: Youth are Leading the
Transition to a Fully Wired and Mobile Nation (July 27, 2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/
pdfs/PIP_Teens_Tech_July2005web.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2008). This figure rose from a mere
73 percent just five years prior. Id.
3. See infra Section II.B.
4. DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, STUDENT ONLINE EXPRESSION:
WHAT DO THE INTERNET AND MYSPACE MEAN FOR STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS? 3
(2006), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/student.internetspeech.pdf. “A big problem is
that school officials do not understand the technologies or what they can and can’t do legally in
terms of regulating student online speech. So we are seeing inaction and overreaction.” Id.
(quoting Nancy Willard, head of the Center for Safe and Responsible Internet Use).
5. See infra notes 11-79 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 80-135 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 136-221 and accompanying text.
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suggests a framework courts should adopt in considering a minor’s
First Amendment rights after school hours.8 Part V concludes that
this case is part of an emerging area of law that will continue to
create mass confusion among lower courts unless the Supreme Court
sets out a universally applicable and practical standard.9
II. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”10 However, not all speech is protected. The Supreme Court
has declined to extend this fundamental right to include “true
threats.”11 “‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals.”12 While no person can claim a fundamental
The Doninger case is particularly interesting because at the appellate level, Judge Sonia
Sotomayor endorsed the Second Circuit’s ruling. Less than a year later, President Barack Obama
nominated Judge Sotomayor to replace retiring Justice David Souter on the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Senate confirmed President Obama’s appointment on August 6, 2009 and Sonia Sotomayor
became our nation’s first Hispanic Supreme Court Justice., Lisa Desjardins et al., Senate Confirms
Aug.
6,
2009,
Sonia
Sotomayor
for
Supreme
Court,
CNNPOLITICS.COM,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/06/sonia.sotomayor/index.html. Among the President’s
remarks regarding Sotomayor: “a judge’s job is to interpret, not make, law: to approach decisions
without any particular ideology or agenda, but rather a commitment to impartial justice; a respect
for precedent and a determination to faithfully apply the law to the facts at hand.” The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in Nominating Judge Sonia
Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court (May 26, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-in-Nominating-JudgeSonia-Sotomayor-to-the-United-States-Supreme-Court/. In her 1997 confirmation hearing to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Sotomayor said, “I don’t believe we should bend the
Constitution under any circumstance. It says what it says. We should do honor to it.” The White
House, Blog Post, The President’s Nominee: Judge Sonia Sotomayor (May 26, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov.Sotomayor/.
This Note explains why the Constitution’s First
Amendment has been “ben[t]” and significantly weakened by the Second Circuit’s holding in
Doninger v. Niehoff (527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008)).
8. See infra notes 136-221 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 222-227 and accompanying text.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). At a public rally, Mr. Watts
commented that if he was forced to join the Army and made to carry a rifle, “the first man I want to
get in my sights is [President] L.B.J.” Id. at 706. Watts was charged with knowingly and willfully
threatening the President. Id. The Court noted that public debates should be uninhibited, robust,
wide-open, and sometimes consist of vehement, caustic, and unpleasant attacks on public officers.
Id. at 708. The Supreme Court found that Watts’ language may have been an offensive opposition
to the President, but this political hyperbole did not amount to a true threat. Id.
12. Id. at 708. Lower courts have attempted to pinpoint the exact nature of a true threat. The
Sixth Circuit has held that speech constitutes a true threat “if a reasonable person would foresee that
an objective rational recipient of the statement would interpret its language to constitute a serious
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right to speak true threats, the Supreme Court has carved out an
entirely different body of First Amendment law for public school
students.
A. The Supreme Court and the First Amendment in Public Schools
The following cases outline which types of student speech the
Supreme Court has held the First Amendment protects and which it does
not. As I will explain, the standard the Supreme Court provides is
anything but precise.13
1. Protection of Student Expression
The first time the First Amendment was recognized to protect
public school students’ speech was in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette.14 There, the West Virginia Board of Education
required students to “salute” the flag while reciting the Pledge of
Allegiance.15 A group of students who were Jehovah’s Witnesses
refused to salute on the ground that the flag was an “image” and
according to their faith, the act of saluting was a forbidden form of
worship.16 The children were expelled from school, and their parents
sought an injunction to prevent the state from prosecuting them for
causing truancy.17 The Court recognized that a school has highly
discretionary educational functions, but is nonetheless a state actor

expression.” United States v. Miller, 115 F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1997). The Eighth Circuit set
forth a multi-factor test to determine how a reasonable person would view the speech, including:
1) The reaction of those who heard the alleged threat; 2) Whether the threat was
conditional; 3) Whether the person who made the alleged threat communicated it directly
to the object of the threat; 4) Whether the speaker had a history of making threats against
the person purportedly threatened; and 5) Whether the recipient had a reason to believe
that the speaker had a propensity to engage in violence.
Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 623 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing
United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996)).
13. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
14. See 319 U.S. 624, 624 (1943).
15. Id. at 628-29. The student was expected to “salute” the flag, by keeping his right arm stiff
with his hand raised, palm facing up. Id. at 628 (discussing the stiff-arm salute).
16. Id. at 629. The Jehovah’s Witness faith believes in a literal interpretation of Exodus 20:45, which states, “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that
is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt
not bow down thyself to them nor serve them.” Id. Members of this faith consider the American
flag an “image” within this interpretation and refuse to salute it. Id.
17. Id. at 629-30.
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bound by the Fourteenth Amendment to respect students’ First
Amendment rights.18
2. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
The trend toward greater respect for students’ freedom of speech
rights continued twenty-six years later when the Supreme Court ruled in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District that
public school officials violated several students’ First Amendment rights
by suspending them for wearing black armbands to school as a silent
protest of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.19 The Court began its reasoning
by stating, “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”20
The Court ruled that a school’s fear or
apprehension of a disturbance is not enough to overcome First
Amendment rights.21 A school does not have absolute authority over its
students’ words.22 In order for a school to prohibit speech, it must show
“that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompanies an

18. Id. at 637. Justice Jackson noted that the school’s purpose was to educate the students
without discounting important constitutional freedoms of the individual and without “strang[ling]
the free mind at its source.” Id. The Court highlighted that freedoms of speech, press, assembly,
and worship do not depend on the judiciary’s outcome but rather are fundamental rights susceptible
to restriction only where it would “prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State
may lawfully protect.” Id. at 637. Justice Jackson thought that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein.” Id. at 642.
What makes this case more applicable to the issue at hand is that the Court noted that even
though those who refused compliance did so on religious grounds, that fact alone does not control
the decision. Id. at 634-35. While religion supplied the motive in this instance, many citizens who
have different religious views also have a compulsory right to demand constitutional protection. Id.
19. See 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
20. Id. at 506.
21. Id. at 508. Justice Fortas noted that any departure from the school’s absolute
regimentation may cause trouble. Id. Any deviation from the majority may start an argument or
disrupt the peace. Id. He believed that these risks are substantially outweighed by constitutional
freedoms. See id.
22. Id. at 511. The Court stated that regardless of whether a student was in school or out of
school, they are still “persons” under the Constitution. Id. Their comments may not be limited to
only those that are officially approved. Id. School officials cannot suppress speech with which they
do not agree or do not wish to hear. See id. “The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of the American schools.” Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 487 (1960). The Tinker Court agreed with the Shelton Court that these children are our
nation’s future and wide exposure to a robust exchange of ideas leaves our future looking much
brighter than succumbing to authoritative selection. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
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unpopular viewpoint.”23 Tinker sets a very high standard: a student’s
speech must “materially and substantially interfere” with the school’s
administrative order to be prohibited.24 The Tinker test is the baseline
standard most frequently applied to student speech cases.25
3. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
In 1986, the Supreme Court applied an exception to the Tinker
standard in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.26 In Bethel,
Matthew Fraser delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for
elective office in front of approximately 600 of his high school peers.27
The speech was part of a school-sponsored assembly.28 During the
entire speech, Fraser referred to his friend in terms of an elaborate,
graphic, and sexual metaphor.29 The Court held that “[t]he constitutional
rights of students in public schools are not automatically co-extensive
with the rights of adults in other settings.”30 The Court established a
balancing test, weighing the freedom of articulating unpopular and

23. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
24. Id.
25. Hudson, Jr., supra note 4, at 8-9. The Supreme Court’s composition at the time of the
Tinker decision was considered liberal in many respects. Id.at 9. It was the same Court responsible
for desegregating public schools, revolutionizing criminal procedure, and invalidating teacher-led
prayer in schools. Id. The Supreme Court did not again visit student speech cases until the 1980s
when the Court featured markedly more conservative justices. Id. This paradigm shift is one
possible explanation for the Court beginning to limit Tinker’s scope by creating exceptions. See
infra notes 26-46 and accompanying text.
26. See 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
27. Id. at 677.
28. Id.
29. Id. Fraser’s speech:
I know a man who is firm – he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character
is firm – but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take
an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts – he drives hard,
pushing and pushing until finally – he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end – even the climax, for each and every one
of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president – he’ll never come between you and the
best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). The next day, Fraser was
suspended three days for violating the school’s disruptive conduct rule. Id. at 678.
30. Id. at 682. The Court ruled that it is rightly the school board’s responsibility to make the
determination of what classroom or class assembly speech is appropriate. Id. at 683. The Court
believed that Fraser’s pervasive sexual innuendo was “plainly offensive” to both students and
teachers. Id. Justice Burger wrote, “[a] high school assembly or classroom is no place for a
sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.” Id. at
685.
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controversial ideas with society’s countervailing interest of teaching
students the values of civil discourse and where to draw the line of
socially appropriate behavior.31 The Court held that in accordance with
the school’s educational mission to teach manners of civility essential to
a democratic society, the school may ban “vulgar and lewd speech” that
would “undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”32
4. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Less than two years later, the Court added another exception to the
Tinker standard when it decided Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.33 In Kuhlmeier, a principal objected to publishing a high
school newspaper that discussed teenage pregnancy and the impact of
divorce upon teenagers.34 The issue in this case was slightly different
than those in Tinker and Fraser because it dealt with whether the school
had to lend its resources to, and affirmatively endorse, the student
speech with which it disagreed.35 The principal reasoned that because
the newspaper was part of the curriculum, educators were permitted
greater deference in determining its contents to assure that the writer’s
views were not attributed to the school.36 The Court agreed, holding,
“[e]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial
control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”37
5. Morse v. Frederick
The Court did not revisit the extent to which public school students
enjoy freedom of speech until 2007, when it decided Morse v.
Frederick.38 The 5-4 decision produced two concurring opinions, one
concurrence in the judgment and dissent in part, and three dissents,
31. See id. at 681.
32. Id. The Fraser Court noted a “marked difference” between the political speech in Tinker
and what it deemed “sexual speech” in Fraser. Id. at 679.
33. See 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
34. Id. at 263.
35. Id. at 270-71. By contrast, Tinker addressed when the First Amendment required schools
to tolerate student speech. Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet: Student Speech and the
First Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 367 (2007) (discussing the Kuhlmeier exception).
36. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271. The Court stated that a school must be able to take into
account the intended audience’s emotional maturity when determining whether it is appropriate to
disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics. Id. at 272.
37. Id. at 273.
38. See 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
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suggesting that the current state of the law is ambivalent at best.39 In
Morse, school officials allowed students to leave school to watch the
Olympic Torch Relay pass through their city.40 Once camera crews
arrived from area news channels, Joseph Frederick and his friends
unfurled a fourteen-foot banner which read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”41
When Frederick refused the principal’s request to take the banner down,
he was subsequently suspended from school for ten days.42 The Court
declined to apply Tinker’s “substantial disruption” standard and instead
held that “[t]he ‘special circumstances of the school environment’ and
the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse . . . allow[s]
schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as
promoting illegal drug use.”43

39. See id. at 404 (acknowledging that the mode of analysis employed in Fraser was not
entirely clear).
40. Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 SUP.
CT. REV. 205, 210 (2007). In 2002, the Winter Olympic Games were held in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Id. As per custom, the Olympic Torch is passed from the site of the previous Winter Games to the
current site. Id. On the day in question, the Torch was passing through Juneau, Alaska, where
Joseph Frederick was then a senior at Juneau-Douglas High School. Id. The Supreme Court
determined that this was a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event because it occurred
during normal school hours and was sanctioned by Principal Morse as an approved social event.
Morse, 553 U.S. at 400. The Court agreed with the school’s superintendent that Frederick cannot
“stand in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and
claim he is not at school.” Id. at 401.
41. Schauer, supra note 40, at 210. Frederick claimed that the nonsense banner was simply a
way to appear on television. Morse, 553 U.S. at 401.
42. Morse, 553 U.S. at 396. The Court believed that although the banner was “cryptic,” it
was reasonable that the high school principal regarded it as promoting illegal drug use which
directly conflicted with the established school policy prohibiting such messages at school events.
Id. at 401. Frederick appealed his suspension to the Juneau School District Superintendent, who
described Frederick’s stunt as “a fairly silly message promoting illegal drug usage in the middle of a
school activity,” but nevertheless, reduced his suspension to eight days. Schauer, supra note 41, at
211.
43. Morse, 553 U.S. at 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969)). The Court reasoned that the danger in this case was far more severe than the
“mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint” set forth in Tinker. Id. The Court felt student drug abuse extends well beyond a
theoretical desire to avoid controversy. Id.
However, the Court was unwilling to accept Morse’s argument that Frederick’s speech should fall
under the Fraser standard as plainly offensive. Id. The Court stated that Fraser should not be
stretched to prohibit any speech that could fit under some definition of “offensive.” Id. Chief
Justice Roberts reasoned that most political and religious speech could be offensive to some. Id.
The offensiveness of Frederick’s speech was not part of the Court’s concern, but rather, that his
conduct was reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. Id.
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6. The Supreme Court Standard Summarized
Commentators greatly anticipated the Morse holding in hopes that
the Court’s decision would clarify prior Supreme Court precedent, the
existing precedents’ interrelationship, and the scope of each case.44 The
decision left commentators disappointed, as the Court declined to
expand its holding beyond student speech promoting illegal drug use.45
The Supreme Court left us with a standard that can be illustrated as
follows: Students retain free speech rights in public schools as long as
their speech does not amount to a “true threat,” does not create a
material and substantial disruption of school activities, or that school
officials can reasonably forecast as creating a substantial disruption,
unless the student’s speech was vulgar, lewd, or undermined the school’s
basic educational mission, or unless the speech is of an offensively
sexual suggestive nature, or unless the speech is school sponsored and
school officials’ actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns, or unless the speech might reasonably be understood as
bearing the imprimatur of the school itself, or unless the speech
advocates illegal drug use.46 This standard is imprecise and unclear.
The Supreme Court should adopt a standard whereby public school
students blogging from home computers outside of school hours may
exercise their First Amendment right to freedom of speech so long as
their expression does not fall into a previously delineated category of
unprotected speech.47

44. Dickler, supra note 35, at 356.
45. See Schauer, supra note 40, at 222 (stating that, in granting certiorari to Morse, the
Supreme Court did not select the most relevant case). The issue in Morse was unique to that case
only. Id. By selecting a case that was not representative of student speech rights as a whole, the
Court in effect refused to answer any other of the myriad of student speech issues that are plaguing
the lower courts, such as Doninger v. Niehoff. See infra Section III.
46. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 553 U.S. 393 (2007).
Confused? You are not alone. The Supreme Court offers lower courts very little guidance.
Judges, lawyers, teachers, and school administrators are certainly no clearer about the state of the
law even though the Supreme Court handed down a student speech decision less than two years ago
in Morse. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 404 (acknowledging that the Court’s earlier standards were not
entirely clear, but declining to clarify the confusion in order to decide the case at hand).
47. Unprotected speech includes: 1) true threats (see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705
(1969); supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text); 2) fighting words (see Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, (1942), stating fighting words are “those by which their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” and “are of such slight
social value . . . that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality”); 3) incitement to riot (see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969), holding a State cannot “forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
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B. The Lower Courts’ Attempts at Creating a Workable Standard for
Student Speech Originating on the Internet
The Supreme Court held in Reno v. ACLU (1997) that speech on
the Internet, as the most participatory form of a mass speech yet
developed, is entitled to the highest level of First Amendment
protection.48 The basis of the Court’s holding was that restricting
indecent adult speech on the Internet to protect minors
unconstitutionally infringed on an adult’s freedom of speech rights.49
Never decided by the Supreme Court, lower courts have attempted to
resolve how student Internet speech fits into the current state of the
law.
1. Internet Speech Brought on Campus by the Speaker
a. J.S.’ Solicitation of a Hitman
In J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, an eighth-grader created
a website from his home computer titled “Teacher Sux” which listed
reasons why his algebra teacher should die, showed a drawing with her
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action”); 4) libel/defamation (see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), stating that a public official must show that the libelous statement was
“made with ‘actual malice’ – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not”); 5) child pornography (see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764
(1982), holding that child pornography may be banned without first being deemed obscene); and 6)
obscenity (see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (reaffirming that obscene material is
unprotected by the First Amendment and defining a three part test to determine whether material is
obscene).
This suggested standard is lower than that set forth in Tinker, and rightfully so. The Tinker
standard was adopted for conduct that occurred on school grounds during school hours. Tinker, 393
U.S. at 508. For more discussion on this standard, see infra Part IV.C.1.
48. 521 U.S. 844, 863. The Communications Decency Act of 1996 made it a crime to
knowingly transmit obscene or indecent messages to anyone under the age of 18, or to knowingly
send or display to any person under the age of 18 any message that “depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory
activities or organs.” Id. at 859-60. The Court held that the statute was overbroad and that it placed
an unacceptably heavy burden on free speech. Id. at 882. The Court conceded that there is a
governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials, but where the indecent speech
falls short of obscene, the interest does not justify unnecessarily broad suppression of speech
addressed to adults. Id. at 875.
49. See id. Justice Stevens concluded the opinion by stating:
As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we
presume that the governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in
encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but
unproven benefit of censorship.
Id. at 885.
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head severed and dripping blood from her neck, and solicited twenty
dollar donations to help pay for a hitman.50 The court considered this to
be on-campus speech because J.S. accessed the website at school, told
other students about the website, and showed it to a classmate.51 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the website caused actual and
substantial disruption of the school’s operations, was the direct and
indirect impact of the teacher’s emotional injuries, and caused students
to fear for their safety.52 As a result, J.S.’s permanent expulsion was
upheld.53
b. Layshock’s MySpace Parody
In Layshock v. Hermitage School District, high school senior
Justin Layshock created a “MySpace” page54 on his grandmother’s
home computer posting a picture of his principal complete with
commentary suggesting the principal was an alcoholic, a drug
abuser, and a “big fag.”55 Justin informed his friends of this parody,
and soon much of the student body accessed the page, causing the

50. 807 A.2d 847, 850-51 (Pa. 2002). As a result of viewing the website, the algebra teacher
testified that she feared someone was going to kill her, suffered stress, anxiety, loss of appetite, loss
of sleep, weight loss, and a general sense of loss of well-being. Id. at 852. She suffered from shortterm memory loss and headaches, was required to take anti-anxiety/anti-depression medication, and
was unable to converse in crowds. Id. The teacher was granted a medical leave for the school year
causing three substitutes to fulfill her duties which “disrupted the educational process of the
students.” Id. Principal Kartsotis explained that the school’s morale was the lowest he had seen in
forty years of education – comparable to the death of a student or staff member. Id.
51. Id. at 865. The court considered there to be a “sufficient nexus” between the website and
the school to consider the speech as occurring on campus, holding, “[w]here speech that is aimed at
a specific school and/or its personnel is brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its
originator, the speech will be considered on-campus.” Id.
52. Id. at 869. Despite finding the statements regarding solicitation of a hitman and reasons
why the teacher should die to be stated unconditionally and unequivocally, the court felt they fell
short of constituting a true threat. Id. at 859. The court wrote:
We believe the website . . . was a sophomoric, crude, highly offensive and perhaps
misguided attempt at humor or parody. However, it did not reflect a serious expression
of intent to inflict harm . . . . Distasteful and even highly offensive communication does
not necessarily fall from First Amendment protection as a true threat simply because of
its objectionable nature.
Id. at 859-60. However, the court found that the website created disorder and significantly and
adversely impacted education, particularly considering the student and staff’s feeling of
helplessness and low spirits. Id. at 869.
53. Id. at 847.
54. MySpace.com is a website where users can share photos, journals, and personal interests
with other users who have created profiles. 412 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (W.D. Pa. 2006).
55. Id. at 505.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 7

FINAL HAYES_MACRO_FINAL FROM EMAIL 1.11.10.DOC

258

1/25/2010 2:34 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[43:247

school to shut down the computer system for five days.56 A federal
judge denied Justin’s request for a temporary restraining order,
holding Justin’s actions substantially disrupted school operations
and interfered with the rights of others.57
2. Internet Speech Brought on Campus by Another Student
a. Wisniewski’s Buddy Icon
In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Central
School District, eighth-grader Martin Wisniewski created an AOL
Instant Messenger “buddy icon”58 of a pistol firing a bullet above a

56. Id. at 508. The lack of access to the computer system caused the school to cancel several
classes and students were not able to access the computers for school purposes. Id. at 508. The
school district’s technology coordinator estimated that during this five-day period he spent 25
percent of his time blocking numerous addresses from which students were attempting to access
MySpace profiles on school computers and setting up firewalls to prohibit access to the website. Id.
The school’s co-principal testified that he dedicated at least 25 to 30 percent of his time dealing with
the disruptions and investigating the source of the parody. Id.
57. Id. The court found that Justin’s conduct did not fall within a Tinker exception, so it
could only be regulated if it substantially disrupted school operations or interfered with the rights of
others. Id. at 507.
Justin was suspended for ten days, placed in the Alternative Curriculum Education Program,
banned from attending or participating in any school sponsored events, and prohibited from
attending his graduation ceremony. Id. at 505. The court commented that it thought Justin’s
punishment was extreme, noting, “[a]lthough the punishment inflicted upon Justin for his conduct is
arguably excessive, the Court is not empowered to second-guess the appropriateness of Defendants’
actions absent some underlying violation of his legal rights” and that “in this case the public interest
is best served by allowing defendants to administer their high school and discipline their students as
they determine, despite the Court’s reservations regarding the appropriateness of Justin’s
punishment.” Id. at 509.
The American Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut (“ACLU-CT”) argued that Justin’s
punishment should not have been upheld. Brief of Amicus Curiae, ACLU of Connecticut, in
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction , Doninger
v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007) (No. 3:07-cv-1129) [hereinafter ACLU-CT Brief].
[N]either the principal’s distraught reaction, nor the “offensive[ness]” and
“unpleasantness” of the speech, nor the fact that students had “buzz[ed]” about the
profile, nor the fact that one computer teacher had threatened to shut down the school’s
computer system . . . nor the fact that the speech was “rude and demeaning,” could
persuade a reasonable jury to find the disruption sufficient. In order for that to happen,
the disruption would have to be so severe as to cause, or threaten to cause, consequences
such as class cancellations, widespread disorder, violence, or student disciplinary action,
or to render teachers “incapable of teaching or controlling their classes.”
Id. at 10.
58. AOL Instant Messenger allows a person to exchange messages in real time with members
who have the same AOL software on their computer. 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008). The program enables users to transmit an icon, created by the sender, on
the computer screen during an IM exchange. Id. at 36. The image remains on the screen for the
duration of the online conversation. Id. at 35.
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person’s head, complete with splattered blood and the words “Kill Mr.
VanderMolen,” despite the administration’s warning a few weeks prior
that threats would be treated as acts of violence and would not be
tolerated.59 During the three-week period he used the icon, Martin
chatted with fifteen of his friends.60 When a classmate told Mr.
VanderMolen of Martin’s icon, the school suspended Martin for a
semester.61 Given the content of the icon, Martin’s distribution of it, and
the period of time he used it, the Second Circuit concluded that Martin’s
conduct crossed the protected student speech boundary, that it posed a
reasonably foreseeable risk that the icon would come to the attention of
school authorities, and that it materially and substantially disrupted the
school’s operations.62
b. Paul’s Top Ten List
In Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, high school student
Zachariah Paul emailed a number of his friends a “Top Ten” list about
the school’s athletic director, which contained statements about the
athletic director’s appearance, including the size of his genitals.63 An
undisclosed student distributed Zachariah’s email on school grounds and
copies were found in the teachers’ lounge, resulting in Zachariah’s tenday suspension.64 The court granted Zachariah’s motion for summary
judgment because the list was created off school grounds, there was no

59. Id. at 36.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 39-40. The court confirmed prior precedent that off-campus conduct could create a
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a school. Id. at 39. In discussing the extent of the
discipline, the court was mindful that “[i]t is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions
of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”
Id. at 40.
63. 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (W.D. Pa. 2001). The list read as follows:
10) The School Store doesn’t sell twinkies. 9) He is constantly tripping over his own
chins. 8) The girls at the 900 #’s [sic] keep hanging up on him. 7) For him, becoming
Franklin’s “Athletic Director” was considered “moving up in the world.” 6) He has to
use a pencil to type and make phone calls because his fingers are unable to hit only one
key at a time. 5) As stated in previous list, he’s just not getting any. 4) He is no longer
allowed in any “All You Can Eat” restaurants. 3) He has constant flashbacks of when he
was in high school and the athletes used to pick on him, instead of him picking on the
athletes. 2) Because of his extensive gut factor, the “man” hasn’t seen his own penis in
over a decade. 1) Even it is [sic] wasn’t for his gut, it would still take a magnifying glass
and extensive searching to find it.
Id. at 448.
64. Id. at 448-49.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 7

FINAL HAYES_MACRO_FINAL FROM EMAIL 1.11.10.DOC

260

AKRON LAW REVIEW

1/25/2010 2:34 PM

[43:247

evidence that Zachariah brought the list onto school grounds, and the
school district failed to satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.65
c. Beussink’s Critical Webpage
In Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District, high school junior
Brandon Beussink created a website at home on his personal computer
which was “highly critical” of Woodland’s administration.66 Brandon
used vulgar language to convey his opinions and invited readers to
contact the school’s principal to express their beliefs regarding
Woodland High School.67 Another student, who found Brandon’s
website while using Brandon’s home computer, accessed the site at
school and showed it to the school’s computer teacher.68 Consequently,
Brandon was suspended ten-days and ordered to shut down his
website.69 The court granted Brandon a preliminary injunction, finding
he would likely succeed on the merits because the school’s discipline
stemmed from him expressing an opinion which upset the
administration, but fell short of Tinker’s standard of causing a material
or substantial disruption.70

65. Id. at 458. The court noted that the speech at issue was not threatening, and although it
upset the athletic director, it did not cause any faculty member to take a leave of absence as in J.S.
Id. at 455. “Disliking or being upset by the content of a student’s speech is not an acceptable
justification for limiting student speech under Tinker.” Id. The court agreed with the plaintiff’s
argument that Zachariah was not engaged in any school activity or associated in any way with his
role as a student when he compiled the “Top Ten” list. Id. at 456. Had he distributed the list
outside of the school environment, he could not have been punished because the government
considered the content inappropriate. Id. at 456-457. The court followed, “[w]hen school officials
are authorized to punish only the speech which occurs on school property, the student is free to
speak his mind when the school day ends” and First Amendment protection “may not be made a
casualty of the effort to force-feed good manners to the ruffians among us.” Id. at 457.
66. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998). Brandon testified that he created the website
to voice his opinion, never intending it to be accessed or viewed at school. Id.
67. Id. Brandon’s website contained a hyperlink which allowed the user to access Woodland
High School’s homepage. Id.
68. Id. at 1177-78. Brandon allowed a friend, Amanda Brown, to use his home computer. Id.
at 1177. While using the computer, Amanda saw Brandon’s website. Id. Brandon and Amanda
subsequently got into an argument, and in an effort to retaliate, Amanda purposefully accessed
Brandon’s website at school. Id. at 1177-78. Amanda testified that she did not access the website at
Brandon’s request, with his authorization, or with his knowledge. Id. at 1178.
69. Id. at 1179. The principal testified that he made the determination to punish Brandon
immediately upon accessing the website. Id. at 1180. The court concluded that this testimony did
not indicate that the principal disciplined Brandon based on a fear of substantial disruption but
because he was upset by the website’s content. Id.
70. Id. The court did not find evidence that Brandon showed the website to other students nor
that Amanda’s viewing the website at school caused a disturbance. Id. at 1178-79. The court
reasoned that if the threat of punishment remained, Brandon and other students had been effectively
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3. Internet Speech that may Foreseeably Reach Campus
a. Mahaffey’s Satanic Support
In Mahaffey v. Aldrich, high school student Joshua Mahaffey
created a website entitled “Satan’s web page,” which listed people he
wished would die and gave readers a murder “mission.”71 A classmate’s
parent notified the police about the website.72 Although the police did
not pursue criminal charges, the school district determined the website
violated the school’s computer use policy.73 The district court found that
there was no evidence that the website interfered with the school’s
duties, thus failing the Tinker standard.74
b. Emmett’s Mock Obituaries
In Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415, eighteen-year-old high
school senior Nick Emmett created a webpage containing mock

denied their constitutional right to engage in free speech. Id. at 1181. The court emphatically
noted:
One of the core functions of free speech is to invite dispute. “It may indeed best
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging.”
Indeed, it is provocative and challenging speech, like Beussink’s, which is most in
need of the protections of the First Amendment. Popular speech is not likely to provoke
censure. It is unpopular speech which needs the protection of the First Amendment. The
First Amendment was designed for this very purpose.
Id. at 1181-82 (quoting Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). Likewise, the court
believed Brandon was punished for speech that was constitutionally protected. Id. at 1181.
71. 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781-82 (E.D. Mich. 2002). Near the bottom of Joshua’s website, the
page read:
SATAN’S MISSION FOR YOU THIS
WEEK: Stab someone for no reason then set them on fire throw them off of a cliff,
watch them suffer and with their last breath, just before everything goes black, spit on
their face. Killing people is wrong don’t do It. unless Im there to watch. Or just go to
Detroit. Hell is right in the middle. Drop by and say hi.
PS: NOW THAT YOU’VE READ MY WEB PAGE PLEASE DON’T GO
KILLING PEOPLE AND STUFF THEN BLAMING IT ON ME. OK?
Id at 781 (all grammatical errors and capitalizations are part of the original).
72. Id at 782.
73. Id. According to a police officer’s testimony, Joshua admitted contributing to the website
and stated that school computers “may have” been used in creating the site. Id. The school
suspended Joshua for his contributions. Id.
74. Id. at 784. The court agreed with the plaintiffs that school officials had exceeded their
powers when they punished Joshua for his out of school conduct. See id. The court also ruled that
Joshua’s actions fell short of constituting a “true threat” because there was no evidence Joshua
communicated the website’s statements to anyone. Id. at 786. Likewise, a reasonable person would
not interpret Joshua’s remarks as intending to harm or kill anyone listed on the website. Id. at 786.
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“obituaries” of two of Nick’s friends.75 When an evening television
news story featured Nick’s webpage as a “hit list” of people to be killed,
Nick immediately removed his site from the Internet.76 Nevertheless,
the next day the principal placed Nick on emergency expulsion.77 The
district court granted Nick’s motion for a temporary restraining order,
reasoning that Nick’s speech fell outside of the Fraser and Kuhlmeier
exceptions because they were not in a school assembly, in a schoolsponsored newspaper, or affiliated with any school project.78 The court
determined the school district failed to meet Tinker’s substantial
disruption standard and “[a]lthough the intended audience was
undoubtedly connected to Kentlake High School, the speech was entirely
outside of the school’s supervision or control.”79
III. S TATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
During the 2006-2007 school year, Avery Doninger was a 16-yearold junior at Lewis S. Mills High School (“LMHS”).80 As the Junior
Class Secretary and a member of Student Council,81 Avery was largely
responsible for coordinating “Jamfest,” an annual “battle of the bands”
concert held at LMHS.82 Due to the construction of a new auditorium
and scheduling conflicts, students were concerned Jamfest might have to
take place in an alternate venue, be postponed from the much anticipated
April 28, 2007 date, or be cancelled altogether.83 Jamfest had already

75. 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2000). The court emphasized that Nick carried a
3.95 GPA, was a co-captain of the school’s basketball team, and had no disciplinary history. Id.
The webpage also contained commentary on the school’s administration and allowed visitors to vote
on who would “die” next – that is, who would be the subject of the next mock obituary. Id. It was
modified by disclaimers warning visitors that the site was for entertainment purposes only and was
not school-sponsored. Id. The obituaries were written “tongue-in-cheek,” inspired by a creative
writing class which assigned students to write their own obituary. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The emergency expulsion was later modified to a five-day short-term suspension. Id.
78. Id. The court noted that the school failed to present evidence that the mock obituaries and
voting were intended to threaten anyone, did actually threaten anyone, or manifested any violent
tendencies whatsoever. Id. at 1090. This, combined with the speech’s off-campus nature, indicated
that Nick had a substantial likelihood of success on his claim’s merits. Id.
79. Id. at 1090.
80. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 203 (D. Conn. 2007). The district court
referred to Avery as “poised, intelligent, and articulate.” Id. at 202.
81. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008).
82. Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 203.
83. Id. at 203-04.
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been postponed twice.84 Because the school year was drawing to a
close, students thought that a later date might not be available, or that
even if a new date were agreed upon, some of the bands might refuse to
play, out of frustration.85 In addition, the teacher responsible for
operating the highly technical light and sound systems in the new
auditorium was unavailable on April 28, 2007.86
During the morning of April 24, 2007, Avery and three other
students sent a mass email to the city’s taxpayers explaining the
students’ dilemma and asking for their support to convince the
administration to hold the concert in the school’s auditorium, despite the
scheduling conflict.87 Around noon the same day, Avery encountered
Principal Karissa Niehoff, visibly upset, in the hallway.88 Principal
Niehoff had been called away from her long-scheduled in-service
training day to respond to the influx of calls and emails received as a
result of the students’ email.89 Avery claimed that Principal Niehoff told
her that Jamfest had been cancelled.90 Principal Niehoff testified that
she told Avery she was disappointed in the students’ decision to send the
email, but that she was open to rescheduling Jamfest so it could be held
in the auditorium on a different date.91 Principal Niehoff also testified
that she told Avery that the students violated the school’s internet policy
by sending the email.92 Principal Niehoff stated she informed Avery that

84. Id. at 203.
85. Id. at 203-04.
86. Id. at 204. The students later learned that the regional Board of Education policy required
that particular teacher’s presence at all such events in the new auditorium. Id.
87. Id. at 205. The parties disagree as to who suggested sending the email. According to
Avery, a faculty advisor insinuated that the students explain their situation via a mass email to the
taxpayers in hopes of enlisting their support. Id. at 204. The faculty advisor testified that her
recommendation was for the students to compile a list of reasons Jamfest should continue as
planned, which they could present to the school’s administration. Id. The other students involved
presented testimony somewhere between Avery’s and the faculty advisor’s version of events. Id.
One student in the group accessed his father’s address book and extracted the majority of the
addresses for the email. Id. at 205. The email explained the Jamfest situation to the taxpayers and
asked them to contact the central office and to “forward [the email] to as many people as you can.”
Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. In the defendants’ brief, they argued that both Avery and Lauren Doninger, Avery’s
mother, signed an Acceptable Use Agreement that stated that the Internet was not to be used for any
reason other than educational purposes. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion
for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. Aug. 20, 2007)
(No. 3:07-cv-1129) [hereinafter Opposition to Preliminary Injuction]. The agreement provided, in
relevant part: “I understand that this access is designed for educational purposes . . . . Should I
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the students acted in a manner that was inappropriate for class officers.93
Principal Niehoff was distressed because she and Superintendent
Schwartz were late to, or forced to miss, several other school-related
activities scheduled for April 24 and 25, 2007.94 They both received
“numerous” phone calls and emails from taxpayers.95
At approximately 9:30 P.M. on April 24, 2007, still upset from her
conversation with Principal Niehoff, Avery posted an entry to her
LiveJournal.com96 blog from her home computer which referred to the
administration as “douchebags” and suggested she would support her
readers if they wrote Superintendent Schwartz or “call[ed] her to piss her
off more.”97
The next morning, April 25, 2007, Principal Niehoff and
Superintendent Schwartz continued receiving phone calls and emails
regarding Jamfest.98 The same four students who signed the taxpayer
email met with Principal Niehoff and Superintendent Schwartz to talk
about scheduling the concert at a later date.99 Principal Niehoff asked
commit any violation, of said policy or corresponding procedures and guidelines, my access
privileges may be revoked, and school disciplinary action as deemed appropriate by the
administration and/or appropriate legal action may be taken.” Id.
93. Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
94. Id. at 206.
95. Id.
96. LiveJournal.com is “[a] blogging platform and online community built around personal
journals.” LiveJournal Inc. – About Us, http://www.livejournalinc.com/aboutus.php (last visited
Sept. 27, 2008). A visitor need not be registered to view other user’s blogs unless the user has
adjusted her privacy settings to restrict access. Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 206. On April 24,
2007 Avery’s blog setting was “public.” Id. LiveJournal.com is a website unaffiliated with LMHS.
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008).
97. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45. Avery’s LiveJournal blog stated:
jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. here is an email that we
sent to a ton of people and asked them to forward to everyone in their address book to
help get support for jamfest. basically, because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is getting
a TON of phone calls and emails and such. we have so much support and we really
appriciate it. however, she got pissed off and decided to just cancel the whole thing all
together. anddd so basically we aren’t going to have it at all, but in the slightest chance
we do it is going to be after the talent show on may 18th. andd..here is the letter we sent
out to parents. [The entry then reproduced the email from earlier in the day.]
And here is a letter my mom sent to Paula and cc’d Karissa to get an idea of what to
write if you want to write something or call her to piss her off more. im down.-Id. (all misspellings and grammatical errors are part of the original blog post). Avery then
reproduced an email Ms. Doninger had sent Superintendent Schwartz earlier in the day. Id. Several
LMHS students commented on Avery’s blog post, including one student who referred to
Superintendent Schwartz as a “dirty whore.” Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 207.
98. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45.
99. Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 207. Also present at the meeting were the students’ faculty
advisor, the teacher in charge of the highly technical light and sound system, and the building and
grounds supervisor. Id. None of the staff present knew of Avery’s blog post at the meeting. Id.
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the students to send out a clarifying email.100 She further spoke to the
students about the proper role of student officers and how they should
resolve such issues in the future, making it clear that mass emails to
taxpayers were not acceptable.101
It was not until May 7, 2007 that the administration found out about
Avery’s blog post.102 On May 17, 2007, Avery was called into Principal
Niehoff’s office and asked to do three things: (1) apologize to
Superintendent Schwartz; (2) show the post to her mother; and (3)
withdraw from running for Senior Class Secretary.103 Avery performed
the first two, but refused to withdraw and subsequently won a plurality
of the votes by virtue of a write-in campaign.104 Nonetheless, Avery was
not permitted to serve as Senior Class Secretary.105 Principal Niehoff

The administrators offered the students the option of holding Jamfest in the cafeteria on April 28,
2007, or in the auditorium at a later date. Id. The students chose the latter. Id. Jamfest was
successfully held in the auditorium on June 8, 2007, and all but one of the bands participated. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46. According to Superintendent Schwartz’s testimony, she alerted
Principal Niehoff of Avery’s blog post after her adult son found it while using an internet search
engine. Id.
103. Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 207. Principal Niefhoff testified that her decision was based
on Avery’s blatant disregard of Principal Niehoff’s suggestion regarding the proper means of
expressing disagreement with the school’s administration and also because the post used vulgar
language and inaccurate information. Id. at 208. Additionally, Principal Niehoff did not think it
appropriate of a class officer to encourage taxpayers to contact the central office “to piss
[Superintendent Schwartz] off more.” Id. There was a factual dispute as to whether Principal
Niehoff permitted Avery to maintain her position as Junior Class Secretary. Id. Again, the court
adopted Principal Niehoff’s testimony that Avery was permitted to finish her term. Id.
Six days later, Avery wrote her apology to Superintendent Schwartz, stating: “Please
accept my apology for the tone and language of the Live Journal entry that I posted on April 24th.”
Id. It is undisputed that Avery also showed her blog to Ms. Doninger. See id. (stating Ms.
Doninger emailed Principal Niehoff and referred to Avery’s blog as “offensive” but urged that
Avery’s punishment was “an over reaching response with enormous consequences” and begged for
a more appropriate punishment).
104. Id. at 208. Class elections were held on May 25, 2007. Id. One of Avery’s friends made
t-shirts in her honor that read “Team Avery” on the front and “Support LSM Freedom of Speech”
on the back and passed them out to a group of students. Id. Avery wore a t-shirt that said “R.I.P.
Democracy.” Id. Principal Niehoff prevented the students wearing the “Team Avery” shirts from
hearing the candidacy speeches unless they removed their t-shirts, stating it was not her intention
“to permit electioneering materials of any kind into the auditorium for the election assembly” on the
grounds that it might unfairly prejudice the students who did not have the same resources. Id.
105. Id. at 209. In an email to Ms. Doninger, Principal Niehoff reasoned, “Avery received a
consequence because she posted the extremely disrespectful blog despite previous conversations
with her addressing the Jamfest event, the use of the auditorium, and appropriate conduct as a class
officer.” Id.
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explicitly denied that the email from April 24, 2007 was the basis of any
disciplinary action.106
B. Competing Arguments
1. Avery’s Argument
Avery argued that the administration violated her First Amendment
rights when they prevented her from running for Senior Class Secretary
and when they did not permit her to wear a “Team Avery” t-shirt into the
auditorium on May 25, 2007.107 She contended that because her blog
post took place within the confines of her home, the administration
reached beyond its authority in disciplining Avery.108 In light of the
“equities tipping sharply in [her] favor” and the administration’s
persistent violation of Avery’s constitutional rights, Doninger contended
a temporary injunction should be granted in order to prevent future
irreparable harm.109
2. Administration’s Argument
Principal Niehoff and Superintendent Schwartz argued that Avery
failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because she had no “right” to

106. Id. The district court credited Principal Niehoff’s testimony because none of the other
three students who signed the Jamfest email made blog posts similar to Avery’s. Id. As such, the
other students did not receive any disciplinary action and were permitted to run for class officer and
Student Council. Id.
107. Id. at 211. The complaint also alleged that the school’s administration denied Avery’s
First Amendment protection when she was not permitted to give a speech during the class elections
held on May 25, 2007. Id. The court considered this sanction to be synonymous with the school
preventing Avery from running for Senior Class Secretary for purposes of its analysis. Id. The
court did not consider any First Amendment claims relating to the students’ Jamfest email. Id.
Doninger’s attorney also argued that balancing the relative harms easily justified granting
a temporary injunction because without it, she would continue to be deprived of her fundamental
right to Freedom of Speech, Equal Protection, and Due Process. Memorandum of Law in Support
of Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Injunction at 15, Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199
(D. Conn. July 26, 2007) (No. 3:07- cv-1129) [hereinafter Application for Temporary Injunction].
In contrast, if a temporary injunction was granted, the defendants’ only “hardship” would be
holding another election for Senior Class Secretary and allowing Avery the opportunity to give a
speech to her class. Id. According to Attorney Schoenhorn, “[b]asically, [the injunction] requires
the defendants to start obeying the law – a burden that should not be onerous to them.” Id.
108. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2008). Avery maintained that her blog did
not contain “fighting words,” “true threats,” or other exceptions to her absolute right to free speech.
Application for Temporary Injunction, supra note 107, at 5.
109. Application for Temporary Injunction, supra note 107, at 5; see also infra note 115
(listing the elements of a preliminary injunction).
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serve as a class secretary.110 Further, the administrators alleged that
Avery could not demonstrate the likelihood of success on the case’s
merits because their actions did not violate Avery’s constitutional
rights.111 As such, the defendants explained that Avery’s motion for
temporary injunction should be denied.112
C. Procedural History
Lauren Doninger filed an action against Karissa Niehoff and Paula
Schwartz in Connecticut Superior Court on Avery’s behalf.113 The
complaint alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and analogous clauses
of the Connecticut Constitution.114 Doninger sought a preliminary
injunction115 asking the court to void the election for Senior Class

110. Opposition to Preliminary Injunction, supra note 92, at 14. Defendants argued that
participation in extracurricular activities, such as student council and athletics, as per the Board of
Education policy, is a privilege, not a right. Id. at 15. The Board policy states:
All students elected student officers, or who represent their schools in extracurricular
activities, shall have and maintain good citizenship records. Any student who does not
maintain a good citizenship record shall not be allowed to represent fellow students nor
the schools for a period of time recommended by the student’s principal . . . .
Id. at 14.
111. Id. at 17. Specifically, the defendants argued the following: 1) Avery’s speech did not
deal with a matter of public concern and therefore is not constitutionally protected speech; 2)
Principal Niehoff and Superintendent Schwartz did not violate Avery’s right to free speech because
the speech was antithetical to the mission of Regional School District #10, vulgar, and knowingly
false; 3) it was reasonable for the defendants to believe that the speech at issue would cause
disruption; 4) Avery was not given consequences because of her speech’s content, but because her
conduct caused disruption; 5) pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Morse v. Frederick,
Avery’s speech is not constitutionally protected; 6) the defendants did not violate Avery’s right to
free speech when they requested the t-shirts not be worn to a school assembly; 7) the defendants did
not violate Avery’s right to Due Process; 8) the defendants did not violate Avery’s right of Equal
Protection; and 9) the Connecticut Constitution does not provide greater free speech protection than
the United States Constitution regarding student speech. See Opposition to Preliminary Injunction,
supra note 92.
112. Id. at 40.
113. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46-47.
114. Id. Ms. Doninger alleged violations of Avery’s Freedom of Speech rights under the
United States Constitution’s First Amendment, her Due Process and Equal Protection rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment, and asserted a cause of action under state tort law for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress. Id.
115. To obtain a preliminary injunction, “[a] plaintiff must establish the following: (1)
irreparable harm; and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships
tipping decidedly in her favor.” Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 209-10. Irreparable harm is
established any time there is a First Amendment violation. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist.,
30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998). “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Id. “There are no de
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Secretary, remove the student now serving as class secretary, hold a new
election in which Avery could run, and to permit Avery, as an elected
class officer, to speak at the 2008 commencement ceremony.116 The
defendants removed the action to federal court.117
1. United States District Court for the District of Connecticut’s
Decision
The district court noted that this case was different from both
Tinker and Fraser because the punishment terminated Avery’s
participation in voluntary, extracurricular activities.118 The court
thought the case was closer to Fraser,119 but did not believe that it
should determine whether disqualifying Avery from running for class
secretary was a “fitting punishment” under the circumstances because
that was for school officials to decide.120 The court established that the
only issue at stake was whether Avery had shown a substantial
likelihood of succeeding in her claim that the defendants’ actions
violated her constitutional rights.121 The court ruled that Avery had not
satisfied that burden.122 In so reasoning, the district court acknowledged
minimis violations of the Constitution – no constitutional harms so slight that the courts are obliged
to ignore them.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 36-37 (2004).
116. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 47. Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunction argued a basis for a temporary
injunction spanning fourteen paragraphs. Application for Temporary Injunction and Order to Show
Cause at 1, Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. July 26, 2007) (No. 3:07-cv-1129)
[hereinafter Application for Temporary Injunction] (essentially plaintiff requested the district court
to bar defendants from continuing to violate Avery’s First Amendment right to Freedom of Speech,
her right to Equal Protection, and her right to Due Process).
117. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 47.
118. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 213 (D. Conn. 2007). The court commented
that Avery’s education was not impeded by her punishment and that she did not have a First
Amendment right to “run for a voluntary extracurricular position as a student leader while engaging
in uncivil and offensive communications regarding school administrators.” Id. at 216.
119. Id. at 216.
120. Id. at 202. The district court reasoned:
It may well be that a more relaxed or more self-assured administration would have let the
incident pass without declaring [the student] ineligible [to run for class office], and
perhaps that is what this administration ought to have done; it is not for us to say. Such a
question, we believe, represents a judgment call best left to the locally elected school
board, not to a distant, life-tenured judiciary.
See id. (quoting Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 1989)).
121. Id. at 202.
122. Id. The court assured that there were no villains in this case. Id. at 203. The judges
believed Avery to be a good student and the defendants were not “tyrants bent on curbing the
constitutional rights of all who criticize them.” Id.
The court determined that neither Doninger’s application of the Tinker standard, nor the
defendants’ application of the Fraser standard provided the appropriate framework in the case at
hand. Id. at 213. The court adopted the position of other circuits by affording great discretion to
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that school officials have a difficult task of balancing the importance of
teaching children to think critically with the values of civil discourse.123
The court was uncertain whether the administration struck the right
balance in this instance, but was confident that the Constitution did not
forbid the action they chose.124
2. Second Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Avery
failed to make an appropriate showing on both her First Amendment and
Equal Protection claims, although it did so on different grounds.125 The
court was unclear whether Fraser applied to off-campus speech, but
concluded that the Tinker standard was adequately established.126 The
Second Circuit recognized the lack of Supreme Court guidance of a
school’s authority to regulate off-campus speech.127 While the court
may not have agreed with her punishment, it concluded that it was not
authorized to intervene absent “violations of specific constitutional
guarantees.”128

school administrators in deciding whether a student is eligible to participate in extracurricular
activities, holding “participation in extracurricular activities . . . is a privilege, not a right.” Id. at
214 (quoting Charles J. Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsey, Education Law 4.05[1], at 4-20 to 4-21)
(citing Felton v. Fayette Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding summary judgment in
favor of school district because student had violated school’s good citizenship rule in stealing auto
parts while participating in the school’s off-campus special vocational program)).
123. Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 202.
124. Id.
125. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 54 (2d Cir. 2008).
126. Id. at 50. Therefore, the court did not decide the extent of Fraser: “We therefore need not
decide whether other standards may apply.” Id. However, because the Second Circuit declined to
decide Avery’s case under a Fraser standard, the court may have “intended to gently telegraph to
the [district court] that it erred in its analysis of Fraser. Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211,
221 (D. Conn. 2009).
127. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48. In the 40 years since the Tinker decision, there have been only
three Supreme Court cases dealing with a student’s right to free speech, despite significantly more
litigation in the lower courts on this subject. See Hazelwood School Dist. No. 403 v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Morse v.
Frederick, 553 U.S. 393 (2007). The Second Circuit has previously held that a student may be
disciplined for expressive conduct, even if the speech occurred off school grounds, when the
conduct “would create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment” provided it
was foreseeable that the expression might make its way onto campus. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ.
of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741
(U.S. 2008) (following the Tinker standard). The court followed this reasoning in holding that
Avery’s conduct posed a substantial risk that LMHS administrators would further be diverted from
their core educational responsibilities in order to repel incessant emails and phone calls. Doninger,
527 F.3d at 51-52.
128. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 54.
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3. Reaching the Merits
It was not until January 2009 that the district court decided both
parties’ motions for summary judgment.129 The defendants argued that
they were entitled to summary judgment because of the court rulings at
the preliminary injunction hearing.130 Avery contended that she was
entitled to a trial on her First Amendment claims because of new
evidence refuting the Second Circuit’s analysis.131 The district court
granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Avery’s blog
entry First Amendment claim, Equal Protection claim, and Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress claim.132 The court denied defendants’
motion for Avery’s First Amendment t-shirt claim.133 Avery’s motion
for summary judgment was denied.134 It is important to note that the
district court may have hedged its ruling of the preliminary injunction
hearings, noting that current First Amendment jurisprudence needed

129. See Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
130. Id. at 218.
131. Id. Avery also thought there was conflicting evidence which could show that she was
punished simply because Principal Niehoff found her blog offensive. Id. Avery’s attorney argued
that the defendants “may have perpetuated a fraud upon this court and continue to do so by asserting
facts that are clearly untrue.” Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Objection to Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment at 1, Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D. Conn. Aug. 20, 2008)
(No. 3:07-cv-1129) [hereinafter Objection to Summary Judgment]. Among other things, this Memo
points to newly discovered emails in which Principal Niehoff states she has “no problem being the
bad guy” and that she does not care that she must miss a health seminar. Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d
at 218.
132. Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 221, 224, 230. The court believed that the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity as to Avery’s blog entry First Amendment claim because even courts
and legal scholars could not distinguish the contours of student Internet speech protection. Id. at
224. It was unreasonable to expect school officials to predict where the line would be drawn in this
new technological era. Id.. Avery’s Equal Protection and Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress claims are not considered in this Note.
133. Id. at 226-27. The court pointed to a factual dispute that would permit a reasonable jury
to conclude that Principal Niehoff may or may not have “chilled” Avery’s speech in forbidding
students to wear “Team Avery” t-shirts to the student class officer elections. Id. at 226.
134. Id. at 219. Even in the light most favorable to Avery, the court was “unconvinced that this
new evidence, without more, creates a genuine issue of material fact. Although there may be a
factual dispute about whether the blog entry was false, there was no doubt that it was misleading.”
Id. According to the court, Avery’s blog suggested that Jamfest was cancelled entirely, when there
was conflicting evidence whether the students were given the option to reschedule the concert in the
auditorium at a later date. Id. The court also noted that it denied Avery’s preliminary injunction
based on the fact that Avery’s punishment may have been, in part, because her blog entry was
offensive and uncivil. Id. at 219. The court continued this rationale in denying Avery’s motion for
summary judgment because “school administrators may have multiple motivations for their actions.
It is possible that Ms. Niehoff was motivated both by the potential for disruption and by the
offensive nature of the blog entry.” Id. at 220.
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much evolution because “the contours of the law in this area are still
unclear.”135
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Doninger Courts Misinterpreted Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has not yet provided the necessary guidance to
decide student cyberspeech cases.136 All four of the cases the Court
decided deal with speech occurring on-campus (Tinker and Fraser) or
during a school-sanctioned activity off-campus (Kuhlmeier and Morse).
Avery’s speech is far different because it originated in her own home
outside of school hours, thus lacking a geographical nexus to the school.
There is a seeming disconnect between the student expression and any
actual disruption to the classroom.137 Many lower courts apply ad hoc
tests in hopes of striking an adequate balance between: (1) a school’s
legitimate and compelling interests in ensuring the safety of both the
student body and the educational process, and (2) allowing kids to be
kids – managing students’ rising use of the Internet as a medium to
convey their often immature and incoherent speech, which may lash out
at school administrators, teachers, and peers (in hardly the most
sophisticated of ways).138 Because there is no more applicable standard,
the legal standard most scholars employ is Tinker’s material or
substantial disruption, unless the speech is indecent, lewd, vulgar, or

135. Id. at 223-24.
136. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008). “The Supreme Court has yet to
speak on the scope of a school’s authority to regulate expression that, like Avery’s, does not occur
on school grounds or at a school-sponsored event.” Id. The Second Circuit noted that they have
visited this issue before when deciding that a student may be disciplined for expressive conduct off
school grounds when this conduct “‘would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within
the school environment’ at least when it was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression
might also reach campus.” Id. (citing Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch.
Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (U.S. 2008)). Here, the court
observed the need to “draw a clear line between student activity that ‘affects matter[s] of legitimate
concern to the school community,’ and activity that does not.” Id. (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.,
Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring in the
result).
137. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Dunwoody Distinguished Lecture in Law: Student Speech Rights
in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1054 (Dec. 2008) (implying there is too attenuated of a
link to draw a causal correlation between student speech occurring off-campus and disruption within
the school).
138. See Kyle W. Brenton, Note, BONGHiTS4JESUS.COM? Scrutinizing Public School
Authority over Student Cyberspeech Through the Lens of Personal Jurisdiction, 92 MINN. L. REV.
1206, 1226-27 (2008) (discussing that the Tinker standard in regards to student cyberspeech cases
and arguing that it is “the wrong tool for the wrong job”).
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plainly offensive (Fraser exception), school-sponsored (Kulhmeier
exception), or can be seen as promoting illegal drug use (Morse
exception).139
1. Avery’s Speech Did Not Fall within a Tinker Exception, so
Tinker Should Have Controlled
The Kuhlmeier and Morse exceptions can quickly be rejected as
irrelevant to Avery’s case because her speech was not school-sponsored;
it occurred in her free time from her home computer,140 and it was not
drug related.141 The Fraser exception is more difficult to dispel. In
deciding the Doninger case, the Second Circuit failed to rely on the
Fraser exception because it believed the Fraser standard to be unclear
as to whether it applies to off-campus speech.142 Even though the court
dismissed the Fraser exception as inapplicable, it seemed to focus
primarily on the content of Avery’s post.143 Specifically, the nature of

139. See Dickler, supra note 35, at 369 (discussing the doctrinal uncertainty in the wake of the
Tinker trilogy). See also Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48 (stating the standard to be applied is that “school
administrators may prohibit student expression that will ‘materially and substantially disrupt the
work and disciple of the school,’” unless: (1) the speech is “vulgar or offensive” because school’s
have a duty to “teach[] students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior,” (2) educators’
interests are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” in “exercis[ing] editorial
control over school-sponsored expressive activities such as school publications or theatrical
productions,” or unless (3) the school is “tak[ing] steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care
from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use”). The Second Circuit
agreed that the Tinker test was the correct standard in deciding Avery’s case, holding, “[b]ecause
Avery’s blog post created a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption at LMHS, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion.” Doninger, 527 F.3d at 43.
140. See Hazlewood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007).
141. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 409. See also supra note 45 (discussing the limitations of the
Morse holding).
142. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 49. The court said that it need not determine Fraser’s scope
because it was uncertain whether Fraser applied to off-campus speech. Id. The court noted:
If Avery had distributed her electronic posting as a handbill on school grounds, this case
would fall squarely within the Supreme Court’s precedents recognizing that the nature of
a student’s First Amendment rights must be understood in the light of the special
characteristics of the school environment and that, in particular, offensive forms of
expression may be prohibited.
Id. The Second Circuit believed that had Avery’s comments occurred in the classroom, Fraser
would certainly apply because there is nothing in the First Amendment that prohibits school
authorities from discouraging inappropriate conduct in the school environment. Id.
143. See id. at 49-51. For example, the court noted: (1) “she called school administrators
‘douchebags’ and encouraged others to contact Schwartz ‘to piss her off more’ – contain[ing] the
sort of language that properly may be prohibited in schools.” Id. at 49. (2) Avery’s language was
“plainly offensive ,” “vulgar,” and “potentially incendiary.” Id. at 50-51.
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her conduct was discussed on eleven pages of the Second Circuit’s 21page decision,144 prompting one commentator to note:
The word “offensive” was used on nine occasions and appeared on
five pages in the opinion; the word “vulgar” was used seven times and
appeared on five pages; the word “civility” was used [four] times and
appeared on four pages; the word “values” was used five times and
appeared on four pages; and the specific “offensive” phrases used by
Doninger (“douchebag” and “pissed off”) were reiterated on nine
separate occasions, appearing on six pages of the opinion.145
That is an inordinate amount of time spent discussing what the
Second Circuit deemed legally irrelevant, or at the very least, tangential
to the principal legal analysis.146 However, the Second Circuit
deliberately indicated its reliance on Tinker.147
2. The Doninger Court’s Disapproval of Avery’s Speech Motivated
its Rulings: Avery’s Conduct Failed to Meet Tinker’s Material
and Substantial Disruption Standard Required to Regulate her
Speech
The Second Circuit relied on three factors in determining that
Avery’s blog foreseeably created a risk of substantial disruption within
the school environment.148 First, the language Avery used to express her
displeasure with the school’s administration was “not only plainly
offensive, but also potentially disruptive of efforts to resolve the ongoing
controversy.”149
What the court appeared to pay little regard was that this speech
came from a sixteen-year-old high school junior, not a member of the
Peace Corps. The court’s reasoning is extreme and a bit out of touch

144. Nicole Black, Commentary: Offensive Criticism Trumps First Amendment Rights, DOLAN
MEDIA NEWSWIRES: THE DAILY RECORD OF ROCHESTER, June 21, 2008 (discussing the Second
Circuit decision in Doninger opens the door to the conclusion that any off-campus criticism of
school administrators having the potential to cause a disruption on campus may result in school
discipline). Nicole Black is an attorney for Fiandach & Fiandach and co-author of Criminal Law in
New York, a West-Thompson treatise. Id.
145. Id. Black wrote that she could not help but wonder whether the disrespectful nature of
Avery’s comments was “the driving force behind the court’s decision in this matter.” Id.
146. Id. See also supra note 139 (discussing the principal legal approach a majority of courts
utilize in resolving these claims).
147. See Donniger, 527 F.3d at 50.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 50-51. The court remarked that her chosen words “were hardly conducive to
cooperative conflict resolution.” Id.
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with the current makeup of high school students’ vocabulary.150 High
school students constantly subject the English language to continual
transformation. “Bad” means good. “Retarded” no longer means having
a mental handicap. “Gay” rarely means to be deliriously happy nor does
it refer to a person’s sexuality.151 “We no longer live in a literal world
where words have one, single, tightly bound definition.”152
Moreover, Avery’s online journal was not a place she should have
been concerned with “resolv[ing] the ongoing controversy,”153 but rather
existed as a forum for her to vent and allow her peers to comment just
the same as young people have been doing for generations.154 In past
150. Posting of Mitchell H. Rubenstein to Adjunct Law Prof Blog: Law Review Ideas,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/law_review_ideas (May 30, 2008) (discussing the
Second Circuit decision in Donniger as a major student First Amendment decision involving
blogs).
[T]his was a good student. She had a disagreement with the school and used the word
[douchebag] . . . . The speech was off campus and the speaker was a high school student.
This is exactly what the First Amendment protects. If this type of speech is not
protected, then what type of speech will be protected? Is a student limited to merely
saying “I disagree” or “please Mr. [P]rincipal, change your mind[?]” Is the problem
with the speech here that the word [douchebag] was used? If so, then the court is
completely out of touch [with] how students and others (lawyers too) talk to one another.
Was there a real threat of disruption? I think not.
Id.
151. Besides meaning “homosexual” and “deliriously happy,” gay is also used as an adjective
to describe what the speaker feels is “stupid” or “lame.” See Adam Sherwin, Gay Means Rubbish,
Says BBC, TIMES ONLINE, June 6, 2006, at http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
arts_and_entertainment/article671972.ece (complaining of the word’s use among British
schoolchildren).
UrbanDictionary.com is a website consisting of slang terminology whereby users submit their
own definitions of a word and other users vote on its accuracy. The top definition for the word
“gay” provides the following explanation: “often used to describe something stupid or unfortunate .
. . [For example,] ‘Man these seats are gay. I can’t even see what is going on!’” Urban Dictionary:
Gay, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=gay (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
152. Posting of Franz Douskey to The Cool Justice Report, http://cooljustice.blogspot.com/
2007/09/douskeys-douche-bag-retrospective.html (Sept. 7, 2007) (discussing how elders should lead
by example in teaching compassion and patience toward our nation’s youth). “Occasionally, I hear
someone call someone else a douchebag. Usually it means how could that person do something so
stupid. People laugh over it. Just like when people call each other schmucks, or pantloads, or
jerkoffs.” Id.
The top Urban Dictionary.com definition for the word “douchebag” is “[s]omeone who has
surpassed the levels of jerk and asshole.”
Urban Dictionary: douchebag,
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=douchebag (last visited June 22, 2009). While
this is hardly a scholarly website, it shows that the phrase is not limited to a literal translation.
153. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51 (quoting the court’s disdain of Avery’s word choice).
154. See Papandrea, supra note 137 at 1037. “Although social networks, blogs, and text
messaging are relatively new technologies, what young people do with them is . . . not that much
different from what prior generations did without technology.” Id. at 1036. Much of this litigation
involving student speech on the Internet is the same quite harmless and at worst tasteless expression
that went unpunished when young people voiced their opinions using diaries, landline phones, pig
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decades, such displeasure would be voiced on the phone, in a diary, or in
person.155 This is the first generation to rely so heavily upon the Internet
to keep in contact with one another. Although to these students it may
seem like a private method of communicating, it is capable
disseminating ideas to an unimaginably broader audience than any
previous form of communication. Should all student blogs be subjected
to the same scrutiny as Avery’s? Imagine the ramifications.156

Latin, or gossiping at the soda shop. Id. at 1036-37. “Students are going to be talking about their
teachers and their classmates anyway; now they are simply using digital media to do it.” Id. at
1093. “Indeed, members of the Court have pointedly noted that the expression at issue [in student
speech cases, generally] would be plainly protected had it occurred in the fabled town square.” Id.
at 1089.
155. See Nicole Black, Muzzling Minor Dissent, DOLAN MEDIA NEWSWIRES: THE DAILY
RECORD OF ROCHESTER, March 10, 2008. Nicole acknowledged that “[t]he blog post in question
certainly is not a shining example of the diplomatic use of terminology,” while pointing out that
“[t]he method of delivery . . . is irrelevant, and the advent of new ways of communicating should
not alter this conclusion. A blog post is no different than the use of a megaphone or mass mailing.”
Id. She also echoed Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s remarks during the Second Circuit’s oral arguments
of the Doninger case, “[p]edagogical rights can’t supersede the rights of students off campus to
have First Amendment rights.” Id.
156. See Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1030 (permitting school authorities to restrict student
Internet speech expands their authority in a way previously unthinkable, thus exceeding Tinker’s
scope and interfering with free speech rights outside the schoolhouse gate).
See also Posting of Lauren Doninger (Avery’s mother) to The Cool Justice Report,
http://cooljustice.blogspot.com/2007/05/tin-horn-dictatorship-buries-write-in.html (May 30, 2007)
(discussing that LMHS should take pride in having produced students who are active in the
democratic process and willing to protest). Ms. Doninger argued that students at LMHS are
required to take a civics class with a course description which states, “this required course is
designed to provide our students with a practical knowledge and understanding of our American
Government . . . students [will] reconnect with democratic behaviors and institutions as citizens of
the United States.” Id. Ms. Doninger asserted that these lessons become “meaningless when basic
democratic principles are abandoned by the school administrators who have treated the First
Amendment rights of [LMHS] students with disdain.” Id. Avery’s mother believed that the email
her daughter and three other students sent to taxpayers was a polite and well-written way to solicit
help from parents which was in accordance with LMHS’s published mission to “encourage
creativity, initiative, and problem solving.” Id. Based on Ms. Doninger’s interactions with the
administration, she gathered that Avery was withdrawn from the Senior Class Secretary Election
because of a “failure of citizenship.” Id. She asked her readers, “[i]s everyone who has mouthed
off in frustration a bad citizen?” Id.
Avery weighed in on Principal Niehoff’s accusation that she failed at citizenship:
I believe in democracy. I believe in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. I believe
that each citizen is responsible for participating in the maintenance of democracy by
challenging government officials when they overreach. The principal accused me of
failing to be a good citizen. I disagree. Apathy and passivity are poor citizenship.
Rallying students and the community to petition the government is good citizenship. I
failed at vocabulary, not citizenship. However, the First Amendment does not limit
protection to those with sophisticated vocabularies (though I will not make the error of
rudeness again).
Posting of Avery Doninger to The Cool Justice Report,
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Second, the court argued that, “Avery’s post used . . . ‘at best
misleading and at wors[t] false’ information that Jamfest had been
cancelled in her effort to solicit more calls and emails to Schwartz.”157
The students were agitated and a sit-in was threatened because they
feared that Jamfest would be cancelled.158 Principal Niehoff and
Superintendent Schwartz received an increase in calls and emails,
causing them to be late to or miss school-related activities.159 Avery and
the other students who sent the email to the taxpayers missed class
because of the need to manage the growing dispute.160 The court held
that “Avery’s conduct posed a substantial risk that LMHS administrators
and teachers would be further diverted from their core educational
responsibilities by the need to dissipate misguided anger or confusion
over Jamfest’s purported cancellation.”161 In a footnote, the Second
Circuit maintained that the test to be applied for expression that had
already been disseminated to other students was whether school officials
“might reasonably portend disruption.”162 As such, the court expressly
rejected Doninger’s argument that the disruption may have stemmed
from the mass email of April 24, rather than Avery’s posting, on the
grounds that actual disruption is not required.163
The court opinions do not indicate that the defendants ever offered
proof that the influx of calls to Principal Niehoff and Superintendent
Schwartz were a result of Avery’s blog. While the court argued that all
that is required is for school officials to reasonably portend disruption,
http://cooljustice.blogspot.com/2008/05/making-world-safe-for-douche-bags.html (May 30, 2008)
(emphasis added) (discussing the importance of defending civil liberties and having leaders
challenge unconstitutional practices). It sounds as though this teenager has pegged what the Second
Circuit failed to distinguish, the difference between “shouldn’t have said” and “didn’t have a right
to say.” See id.
According to Jonathan Turley, a law professor at George Washington University, the
Second Circuit got this decision all wrong, stating, “[t]he continual expansion of the authority of
school officials over student speech teaches a foul lesson to these future citizens. I would prefer
some obnoxious speech than teaching students that they must please government officials if they
want special benefits or opportunities.”
Posting of Steve Collins to BristolToday.com,
http://bristolnews.blogspot.com/2009/05/sotomayor-under-scrutiny-for-doninger.html (May 27,
2009, 16:37 EST).
157. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51 (quoting the lower court’s decision).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. The court reasoned that it was foreseeable “that school operations might well be
disrupted further by the need to correct misinformation as a consequence of Avery’s post.” Id.
161. Id. at 51-52.
162. Id. at 52 n.3 (citing Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1998)
and relying on prior precedent, Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494
F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (U.S. 2008)).
163. Id. at 51.
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there is no indication that the school received, or would receive in the
future, any calls from Avery’s post. Likewise, LiveJournal.com is a
social networking site dominated primarily by the younger generation.164
Because Avery’s blog was predominately, if not almost exclusively,
viewed by her peers, school officials should not have reasonably
expected that Avery’s post would encourage an older generation, those
that likely sent the emails and made the phone calls, to contact
administrators “to piss [them] off more.”165 Wouldn’t this same older
generation have been discouraged by Avery’s immature rant? It seems
reasonable to think that the generation making phone calls and sending
emails to school officials would not be as familiar with the blog site
Avery used to voice her displeasure. If they did happen to stumble
across it, the older generation most likely would have written it off as an
adolescent tirade. Adults would be more likely to respond to the
carefully considered and more formal email that the Student Council
members sent taxpayers.
Furthermore, the court noted that its decision relied on the fact that
Avery’s post was “at best misleading and at worst false.”166
LiveJournal’s very purpose is to be used as “a private journal, a blog, a
discussion forum or a social network.”167 Assuming, arguendo, that the
information posted was false; there is no requirement that a LiveJournal
post must be true.168 It is commonplace for kids to be dishonest in their
own journals; however, “neither factual error nor defamatory content,
nor a combination of the two, suffice[] to remove the First Amendment
shield from criticism of official conduct.”169
Last, the court determined that “participation in voluntary,
extracurricular activities is a ‘privilege’ that can be rescinded when
164. Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing the generation gap between people under 25 and
the unnaturalness of “older people” utilizing such social networking sites).
165. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45 (quoting Avery’s blog post). See also supra note 185 and
accompanying text (noting that Superintendant Schwartz required the assistance of her adult-son to
actually find and access Avery’s blog-post).
166. Id. at 51.
167. LiveJournal Home Page, http://www.livejournal.com (last visited Sept 23, 2009).
168. “Blogs and home pages provide young people an opportunity to engage in
autobiographical expression and ‘cathartic storytelling’ that can promote self-realization and selfreflection.” Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1034 (quoting Susan McKay et al., Wired Whizzes or
Techno-Slaves? Young People and Their Emergent Communication Technologies, in TALKING
ADOLESCENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNICATION IN THE TEENAGE YEARS 185, 192 (Angie
Williams & Crispin Thurlow eds., 2005), available at http://faculty.washington.edu/thurlow/papers/
McKay,Thurlow,Toomey-Zimmerman(2005)-chapter.pdf.
169. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (affirming the Third Circuit’s ruling that a
stranger’s illegal conduct does not prohibit a third person from exercising First Amendment rights)
(emphasis added).
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students fail to comply with the obligations inherent in the activities
themselves.”170 According to a well-respected treatise on education law:
Students have no right or property interest in participation in
extracurricular activities. Participation is thus considered a privilege
which may be extended or withdrawn at a board’s discretion . . . the
discretion . . . is not without limit. A board may not . . . :
• Prevent students from participating as a penalty for the exercise of
constitutional rights . . . .
• Extend or withdraw the privilege to participate arbitrarily . . . . 171

While the court is correct in stating participation in extracurricular
activities is a privilege, the privilege cannot be revoked as a result of
exercising the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. As
explained, it does not matter how slight the punishment; any time there
is a First Amendment violation, there is irreparable harm.172 In the same
way, school administrators cannot arbitrarily punish Avery for her blog
post when the concerted group-drafted email was, in all likelihood, the
primary reason for the increase in calls and emails.
In discussing the punishment itself, Principal Niehoff stated that
Avery’s penalty was based on her “failure to accept Principal Niehoff’s
prior suggestions regarding the proper means of expressing disagreement
with administration policy and seeking to resolve those disagreements,
and also because the blog included vulgar and inaccurate
information.”173 Because the Second Circuit decided that Fraser’s
vulgar standard was inapplicable,174 the punishment must stand based on
Avery’s failure to accept Principal Niehoff’s suggestions regarding the
proper means of expressing disagreement with administrative policy.
Avery’s testimony indicated that Principal Niehoff’s suggestion
170. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 52. Extracurricular activities can be defined as those that are
school sponsored which supplement, but are not part of, a required academic track. 3-8 MB,
EDUCATION LAW § 8.07 (James A. Rapp 48th ed. 2009).
171. 3-8 MB, EDUCATION LAW § 8.07 (James A. Rapp 48th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). In
addition, the view that there is no property right to participate in extracurricular activities is not
uniform. Id. “A minority of cases holds that students have constitutionally protected interests in
extracurricular activities.” Id.
172. See supra note 115 (discussing the standard of harm required for preliminary injunctive
relief of a constitutional violation).
173. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 208 (D. Conn. 2007) (emphasis added). If the
administration punished Avery because of her blog’s vulgarity, they certainly singled her out. The
student who commented on Avery’s blog and referred to Superintendent Schwartz as a “dirty
whore” was never punished and later received an award for good citizenship. Objection to
Summary Judgment, supra note 131, at 26.
174. See supra note 122.
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regarding acting in a manner appropriate to class officers did not occur
until April 25, 2007, the day after her LiveJournal post.175 The district
court should have engaged in a fact-finding process to determine if a
conversation about Avery’s expected behavior took place prior to her
LiveJournal post. If not, Principal Niehoff’s justification for punishing
Avery would have no substantive value.
What Principal Niehoff’s testimony does reveal is that she told
Avery that using the school computer system to send a personal email
violated the school’s internet policy.176 However, Principal Niehoff
informed Avery that Superintendent Schwartz deserved an apology, and
that the students should send the taxpayers a corrective email.177 Do
administrators get to pick and choose what personal emails indeed
violate the school’s internet policy? It was unacceptable to send the first
email, but Principal Niehoff recommended that the students break the
internet policy once more for her own personal benefit. Giving
administrators this sort of unfettered discretion could potentially chill all
juvenile speech.178
The punishment was also futile because Principal Niehoff was not
aware of Avery’s blog until May 7, 2007, thirteen days after Avery
posted her blog.179 The court’s concern that administrators and teachers
would be further diverted from their core educational responsibilities
probably would have become moot almost two weeks later. Principal
Niehoff did not inform Avery of her punishment until May 17,180 23
days after her LiveJournal post. The risk of disruption surely would
have vanished in that time.

175. See Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 205. Avery’s testimony revealed that she and Principal
Niehoff encountered each other in the hallway. Id. Avery testified that Principal Niehoff told her
that she was upset about the numerous phone calls and emails, that Jamfest was cancelled, and that
she should draft an apology letter to Superintendent Schwartz. Id. Nothing in Avery’s testimony
suggested that the two ever conversed about Avery’s duties as a class officer. Principal Niehoff
testified that she told Avery, among other things, that she was disappointed the Student Council
members had sent out an email to taxpayers, that the email contained incorrect information, that she
was open to rescheduling Jamfest, and that the students had failed to act in a manner appropriate to
class officers. Id. The court relied on other students’ testimony that Jamfest was never definitively
cancelled. Id. at 205-06. The court never mentioned whether they adopted Avery’s or Principal
Niehoff’s testimony regarding whether the conversation about what constituted a class officer’s
appropriate behavior ever took place. If it did not, there may be another issue as to whether the
school violated Avery’s Due Process rights. Due Process violations are not discussed in this Note.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. For more on this slippery slope, see infra Section IV.C.
179. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
180. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2008).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

33

Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 7

FINAL HAYES_MACRO_FINAL FROM EMAIL 1.11.10.DOC

280

1/25/2010 2:34 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[43:247

Accordingly, the district court failed to show that Avery’s speech
met Tinker’s standard of material and substantial disruption.181 The
Second Circuit’s reliance on the offensive nature of Avery’s speech,
coupled with Principal Niehoff’s insistence that Avery’s post was vulgar
and inaccurate suggests that they merely disapproved of Avery’s speech.
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show
that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that
engaging in the forbidden conduct would “materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school,” the prohibition cannot be sustained.182
The school and the judiciary’s condemnation of Avery’s word
choice should not be enough to elicit censure under Tinker.183
B. The Doninger Courts Distinguished Their Rulings from Patterns
Evolving in Lower Courts
Section II of this Note contains three categories of student speech in
the lower courts: (1) Internet Speech Brought on Campus by the
Speaker; (2) Internet Speech Brought on Campus by Another Student;
and (3) Internet Speech that may Foreseeably Reach Campus.184 There
is no indication from either the District of Connecticut or the Second
Circuit that Avery’s blog was ever accessed by her or another student at

181. The district court’s only mention of the school administration continuing to receive phone
calls and emails after the April 25, 2007 meeting was that “the two administrators continued to
receive phone calls and emails regarding Jamfest, and it is unclear which of those communications,
if any, resulted from Avery’s blog.” Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 207 (D. Conn.
2007). The Second Circuit said only, “Schwartz and Niehoff . . . continued to receive phone calls
and emails in the controversy’s immediate aftermath.” Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46 (emphasis added).
182. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (citing Burnside
v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
183. “The complaints simply do not rise to the level of a ‘disruption’ much less a ‘material and
substantial interference’ . . . Certainly students . . . have a right to be ‘upset’ when confronted with a
viewpoint with which they disagree.” ACLU-CT Brief, supra note 57, at 12-13 (quoting K.D. v.
Fillmore Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 05-CV-0336(E), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33871, at *16-17 (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 2, 2005)).
Avery’s attorney, Jon Schoenhorn, argued that the Second Circuit’s ruling would
emasculate students’ First Amendment rights. Posting of Arielle Levin Becker to The Cool Justice
Report, http://cooljustice.blogspot.com/2008/05/making-world-safe-for-douche-bags.html (May 30,
2008). “If this [blog post] was potentially disruptive, then they might as well empty out half of the
schools of not just Connecticut but probably in this country.” Id.
184. See supra Section III.B.
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LMHS.185 While the purpose of her post was unquestionably to solicit
action which would occur on campus, it cannot fall under category (1)
because, unlike J.S., Avery never accessed the website at school, nor
told other students about the website, nor showed it to another classmate
while at school.186 Unlike Layshock, Avery’s post did not cause the
school’s computer system to be shut down for five days nor was the
school district’s technology coordinator forced to dedicate 25 percent of
his time to blocking students’ access to her post.187
Even assuming that we consider Mrs. Schwartz’s adult son a
“student” at LMHS and thus classify Avery’s speech in category (2),
courts are split as to whether the speech is protected under a student’s
First Amendment rights.188
While the Second Circuit decided
Wisniewski only one year before the Doninger case, Martin’s speech was
far more taboo than Avery’s speech.189 The court rejected Principal
Niehoff’s broad reading of Wisniewski that schools may regulate offcampus offensive speech like Avery’s, as long as it is “likely to come to
the attention of school authorities.”190 Relying on the Wisniewski test, as
articulated in Tinker, the Second Circuit determined that Avery’s post
would foreseeably reach school property.191 However, what the Second
Circuit did not mention was that her post reached school grounds not

185. See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46 (finding that the administration learned of Avery’s
LiveJournal post only after Superintendent Schwartz’s adult son found it while using an internet
search engine).
186. See supra Part II.B.1.
187. Id.
188. See supra Part II.B.2.
189. In Wisniewski, the Second Circuit followed Tinker in holding that a student may be
punished for expressive conduct occurring off school grounds when this conduct “would
foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment,” only if it was
“similarly foreseeable that the off campus expression might also reach campus.” Doninger, 527
F.3d at 48. The court thought Judge Newman’s concurrence in Thomas v. Board of Education to be
applicable to Avery’s case. Judge Newman observed, “territoriality is not necessarily a useful
concept in determining the limit of [school administrators’] authority.” Id. (quoting Thomas v. Bd.
of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring in
the result)).
190. Id. at 50. However, the Second Circuit did accept Niehoff’s alternative argument that
Avery’s speech met the Tinker standard. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling
even though the lower court did not expressly rely on Tinker. Id. In so deciding, the Second Circuit
opted not to decide which other standards to apply when considering the extent to which a school
may discipline off-campus speech. Id.
191. Id. Although Avery’s speech was created off-campus, the court argued that it was
purposely designed to come onto campus. Id. “The blog posting directly pertained to events at
LMHS, and Avery’s intent in writing it was specifically to encourage her fellow students to read
and respond.” Id. Avery’s classmates did indeed read and post comments in response to Avery. Id.
The Second Circuit noted that Avery’s post managed to reach school administrators. Id.
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through any action by her or fellow classmates, but from an
administrator’s son searching his mother’s name. It seems incomparable
to analogize a homicidal “buddy icon” to a blog post referring to the
administration as “douchebags.”192
Additionally, Wisniewski’s
administration had warned students that threats would be treated as acts
of violence and would not be tolerated.193 Avery’s post fell well short of
even implying a threatening or violent nature, nor is there any evidence
that the student body was warned of such a strict intolerance.
Courts which have decided cases falling into category (2) have
strayed from the Second Circuit’s holdings and have ruled that a
student’s speech is protected by the First Amendment.194 The Doninger
facts draw more similarities to these cases. In Killion, Zachariah
actually distributed his “Top Ten” list via email to his friends,195
whereas Avery passively posted her displeasure on an online journal.
Like Zachariah’s list, Avery’s post was created off school grounds; there
is no evidence that Avery brought the list onto school grounds, and the
school district arguably failed to meet Tinker’s substantial disruption
standard.196 Avery’s language was arguably less offensive than

192. Avery’s attorney voiced his concern with the Second Circuit’s decision to follow
Wisniewski, stating, “[t]hey appear to equate words with bullets . . . And that is a scary prospect to
me.” Becker, supra note 179.
Some commentators believe that student speech “cannot become on-campus speech simply
whenever a third party or a school official brings or accesses the material on the Internet at school.”
Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1057.
193. See supra text accompanying note 58.
194. See supra Part II.B.2.a. and supra Part II.B.2.b.
195. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., supra note 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Western District of
Pennsylvania’s holding in Killion); supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing why Avery’s conduct failed to
meet the Tinker standard). See also Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding
that “[t]he district court thus correctly determined that in these circumstances, ‘it was reasonably
foreseeable that other LMHS students would view the blog and that school administrators would
become aware of it.’”) (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 217 (D. Conn. 2007)).
The Tinker test is not whether it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the administration would become
aware of Avery’s post, but whether her actions would materially and substantially interfere with the
school’s operations. See supra text accompanying note 24 (discussing the Tinker standard).
Neither the District of Connecticut nor the Second Circuit provided significant analysis as to
whether the emails and phone calls to the school for a few days (arguably not enough to invoke a
substantial disruption) came as a result of the students’ emails to the taxpayers or as a result of
Avery’s post to an obscure online site.
“Substantially” means just that. Mere student “buzz,” i.e. animated discussion in
response to the speech content, does not rise to the level of “substantial disruption” . . .
Nor do the shock, outrage, revulsion or hurt feelings of teachers or administrators . . . .
Rather, the anticipated disruptive effect must be severe enough to threaten academic
“discipline” to the point where the school cannot “operate normally.”
ACLU-CT Brief, supra note 57, at 3.
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Zachariah’s because it did not personally attack her administrators’
appearance nor did it tastelessly refer to their genitalia.197
Under category (2), Avery’s actions were probably most similar to
Brandon Beussink’s conduct.
Both Brandon and Avery posted
inappropriate language to a website to express displeasure with the
school’s administration. Brandon’s behavior went one step further in
that he created his own website for the purpose of criticizing the faculty
and staff and posted a link to his school’s homepage, hoping his readers
would contact the school’s principal with their disapproval.198 The
Eastern District of Missouri found that Brandon was wrongfully
suspended because his punishment was a result of the administration
being upset with his actions.199 Likewise, Avery’s discipline came
twenty-three days after her controversial language was posted online.200
The lingering effects of her words were probably an upset administration
rather than a material and substantial disruption that lasted almost three
and a half weeks.
However, because Avery’s speech was neither brought on campus
by her nor by another student, it seems that its most logical fit would be
under category (3): Internet Speech that may Foreseeably Reach
Campus. The Eastern District of Michigan upheld a student’s First
Amendment rights when he posted murder “missions” on a webpage
after admitting that school computers “may have been used to create the
website.”201 If a court can uphold a student’s free speech rights in
creating a website which listed fellow students as people he wished
would die,202 courts should likewise uphold Avery’s right to use
questionable, juvenile language to vent her disapproval.
Similarly, the Second Circuit should have followed the Western
District of Washington’s decision in Emmett.203 Like Avery, Nick
Emmett was a good student, actively involved in extracurricular
activities, and had no disciplinary background.204 While Nick’s speech
was arguably more distasteful than Avery’s speech in that his website

197. See supra note 63 (reproducing Zachariah’s “Top Ten” list).
198. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
202. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding that Joshua
listing names under the heading “people I wish would die” was no more of a threat to those listed
than Joshua listing names under the heading “people that are cool” make those listed therein
“cool”).
203. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 75.
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provided “mock obituaries” of his friends and allowed visitors to vote on
who would “die” next, the court held that Nick’s language was far too
removed from school activities for the school to regulate it.205 For the
Second Circuit to rule that LMHS administrators could punish Avery for
her speech gives the administration an extraordinary around-the-clock
power to police student lives and student morals.206 Accordingly, under
either category (2) or (3), Avery would have prevailed had the Doninger
courts followed the standard developing in the lower courts instead of
following its own agenda.207
C. Recommendations for a More Workable Standard
1. The Supreme Court Must Decide This Issue to Create a Standard
That Lower Courts Can Universally Apply
Even though most courts continue to apply the Tinker test to
student Internet speech cases, the Supreme Court must offer guidance to
lower courts in order to achieve consistency.208 Some commentators
believe Tinker to be an effective test,209 while others believe it is the
“wrong tool” for the job.210 As it stands, “[t]here is no clear line . . . And
the line appears to be moving.”211
205. See supra text accompanying note 79.
206. See ACLU-CT Brief, supra note 57, at 5; for further discussion. See infra Part IV.C.1.
207. The district court did not see Avery’s punishment as “discipline” but rather the denial of a
privilege, which the court did not believe to implicate her First Amendment rights. Black, supra
note 151.
The [district] court [in Donniger] decided to engage in the creative endeavor of
redefining “discipline” and “reality” rather than accepting an unpalatable alternative:
acknowledging that students have the constitutional right to criticize school
administrators, as long as the on or off-campus critique does not “substantially and
materially interfere” with school operations or the dissent levied on-campus is not lewd,
profane or sexually explicit.
Id. (referring to the Tinker and Fraser standards).
208. See Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1065. “The lower courts are all over the map” in the
way they apply Supreme Court precedent. Id.
209. See, e.g., Hudson, Jr., supra note 4, at 21.
“I actually think Tinker is a good balance . . . . You have the right to swing your fist in
the air until it threatens the security of my nose. You have the right to express your
thoughts freely, until your expression of thoughts is or has the potential of causing
substantial harm. We all need to be able to deal with disagreements, and people in
positions of authority certainly must deal with the expression of speech that challenges
their exercise of authority. But trashing other people for the enjoyment of trashing other
people does not serve any purpose.”
Id. (quoting Nancy Willard of the Center for Safe and Responsible Internet Use).
210. Brenton, supra note 137, at 1226-27.
Any off campus speech, by any speaker, may create a material and substantial disruption
on campus. If Mary Beth Tinker had appeared on the evening news to protest the
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The Tinker standard is unworkable in the Internet age because
many courts are far too deferential to the schools’ claims that the student
speech caused substantial disruption without applying their own
independent analysis.212 Instead of trying to modify the Tinker standard
to account for technology advances, courts should employ an entirely
different standard. Punishment based on student speech originating from
students’ home computers should be subjected to such a heightened
scrutiny, with regulations only being warranted if it is of such low value
as to be considered “unprotected.”213 This type of expression differs
from all other types considered by the Supreme Court because it requires
affirmative steps for access, making its medium of expression much less
pervasive than any of the Supreme Court cases already decided.214 In
addition, regulating student speech occurring off school grounds opens
the floodgates for school administrators to regulate almost all student
speech.215 Because Internet speech frequently concerns topics related to

Vietnam War, it could have caused a greater disruption of her school than her black
armband, but such speech should be no more regulated than silent protest. To employ
the Tinker test to answer the threshold question of when [student cyberspeech should be
regulated] is to use the wrong tool for the wrong job.
Id.
211. Hudson, Jr., supra note 4, at 19 (quoting Nancy Willard).
212. Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1067 (citing Cuff v. Valley Centr. Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp.
2d 415, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting deferential approach of courts to First Amendment challenges
to schools disciplining students) and Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387, 1389-92 (D.
Minn. 1987) (noting that deference to school officials is not limitless, yet concluding that the school
could punish students even though distribution of an underground newspaper did not disrupt any
regular school activity). “[C]ourts generally permit the unreasonable reaction of teachers and
school officials to constitute a disturbance.” Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1067.
213. See supra note 47. “As a bright-line rule, courts should continue to declare that speech
that lacks any sort of physical connection to the school should fall outside the school’s jurisdiction.”
Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1090.
214. See supra note 102 (noting the indirect fashion in which Avery’s blog post reached the
attention of school administrators).
215. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir.
1979):
It is not difficult to imagine the lengths to which school authorities could take the
power . . . . it is conceivable that school officials could consign a student to a segregated
study hall because he and a classmate watched an X-rated film on his living room cable
television. While these activities are certainly the proper subjects of parental discipline,
the First Amendment forbids public school administrators and teachers from regulating
the material to which a child is exposed after he leaves school each afternoon. . .
The risk is simply too great that school officials will punish protected speech and
thereby inhibit future expression. In addition to their vested interest and susceptibility to
community pressure, they are generally unversed in difficult constitutional concepts . . . .
Since superintendents and principals may act “arbitrarily, erratically, or unfairly,” the
chill on expression is greatly exacerbated.
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classmates and teachers, permitting school authorities to restrict such
speech gives schools unbridled discretion to restrict juvenile speech
generally.216
2. School Administrators Cannot Punish Student Online
Expression Merely Because They Disapprove of the Message
When schools rely on the “I do not like the speech the student
chose to use” rationale, courts have a tendency to invalidate the student’s
punishment.217 “[T]he government may not prohibit expression simply
because it disagrees with its message . . . .”218 However, when
administrators can provide evidence of how the student’s speech
substantially negatively impacted the school’s operations, courts are
more likely to uphold the school’s disciplinary measures.219 Because
courts cannot prohibit speech because of a “mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompanies an unpopular
viewpoint,”220 courts imposing a presumption that the student’s speech is
protected under the First Amendment would largely reduce the ad hoc
balancing tests that result in as many different outcomes as there are
(citing Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 809 (2d Cir. 1971)). Allowing school
officials to regulate speech whenever it comes to their attention would grant them the power to
punish students who engage in political protests outside city council meetings, write inept letters to
the editor in the local newspaper, or simply talk with friends at the mall. Papandrea, supra note 137,
at 1092.
216. Id. at 1091. “Given this reality, it is hard to imagine when it would not be directed to
campus, or when it would not be reasonably foreseeable that students’ digital expression would
come to the school’s attention.” Id. at 1091-92.
217. See, e.g., Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
“Disliking or being upset by the content of a student’s speech is not an acceptable justification for
limiting student speech under Tinker.” Id. at 1180.
218. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416 (1989) (stating the First Amendment prohibits
viewpoint based laws, “[w]e do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so
we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.”) Id. at 420.
219. See, e.g., supra notes 50-52 (discussing the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding in
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District). See also Posting of “SHG” to The Cool Justice Report,
http://cooljustice.blogspot.com/2008/05/more-coverage-of-douche-bag-court.html (May 30, 2008)
(stating that the Ninth Circuit did not provide evidence of how Avery’s remarks created a
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption):
While the earlier rule [Tinker] held that students maintained a constitutional right to
speech, even within the school yard, the [Ninth] Circuit’s vision is that they not only
forfeit speech going into the school, but do so again on the way out. Avery’s challenge
to school officials’ hegemony was made in a blog post, well beyond the proverbial
schoolhouse gates of the past . . . . The test applied by the Circuit is extremely curious . .
. weeding out acceptable exercise of Freedom of Speech because it had the potential to
create thought and ideas that might be disruptive fundamentally undermines the right.
Id.
220. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
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jurisdictions. Furthermore, Internet-use policies should be written in a
way that clearly defines prohibited conduct. If school districts do not
provide students with clear guidelines, they open themselves up to
possible due process claims when they punish students who violate an
ambiguous policy.221
3. School Officials May Resort to Alternative Measures to Address
Harmful Material Students Post on the Internet
School administrators do not have to ignore harmful material
surfacing online even if their authority may be limited. Before
infractions occur, schools should educate their students on how to use
the Internet safely and responsibly. If students do not comply, there are
alternatives to school-sanctioned punishment, such as notifying the
parents or police, talking to the students involved, and offering support
services to any troubled student.222 If speech is so endangering as to
become actionable, the courts provide an adequate remedy that is
Schools can
sufficient to punish truly threatening behavior.223
effectively ensure that troubled students receive the help they need
without overzealously policing their every online commentary.
More importantly, parents are far better suited to monitor and
regulate their child’s online behavior.224 “Parents still have their role to
play in bringing up their children, and school officials, in such instances,

221. See supra note 175 (discussing due process in Donniger). See e.g., Coy v. Bd. Of Educ.
Canton City Schools, 205 F.Supp.2d 791, (N.D. Ohio 2002) (discussing a student challenge to a
high school’s discipline codes and internet-use policies).
222. See, e.g., Hudson, Jr., supra note 4, at 26. “There is a lot that schools can do short of
imposing disciplinary actions, such as educating kids about responsibilities online and educating
parents about the Internet. If a school official is aware of cyberbullying, one option is . . . [to] call
the parent of the student.” Id. (quoting National School Boards Association Staff Attorney Thomas
Hutton).
223. See Brenton, supra note 138, at 1244 (stating that the juvenile justice system protects
against “true threats” and punishes dangerous behavior).
224. Cf. Thomas E. Wheeler II, Lessons from The Lord of the Flies: The Responsibility of
Schools to Protect Students from Internet Threats and Cyber-Hate Speech, 215 Educ. L. Rep. 227,
244 (2007) (“While school administrators are given broad discretion . . . they must resist the
temptation to over regulate . . . . The ethical responsibility for individual conduct must rest with the
individual, and not the schools. The primary teachers are parents and families, not governmental
agencies.”).
Avery’s mother did indeed “police” Avery’s poor choice in words. “My mother also put
my word choice on her scale of justice. She found my comment rude, sophomoric, and below the
standards she has set. My mother’s verdict, as one commentator put it, ‘Avery, you’re grounded
and we’re going to the Supreme Court.’” Avery Doninger, supra note 152 (quoting Colin McEnroe,
WTIC radio AM 1080 broadcasted October 2, 2007).
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are not empowered to assume the character of Parens patriae.”225
Instead of simulating a parental role, school officials might want to
discuss the possible consequences of Internet speech, its lack of
anonymity, and the real harms that speech can cause.226
V. CONCLUSION
Student Internet speech may be tactless and inflammatory, causing
infinite problems for school administrators attempting to maintain order
and teach civility to young people.227 Nevertheless, students are entitled
to First Amendment rights in public schools, even if the rights are
somewhat limited.228 This Note proposes that under current Supreme
Court precedent, Avery Doninger’s speech did not materially and
substantially disrupt her school’s operations.229 In the alternative, this
Note explains that the District of Connecticut and the Second Circuit
should have followed evolving lower court precedent in their Doninger
holdings because Avery’s language was not brought on-campus by her
or another student but rather it was speech that may have foreseeably

225. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that a county board of education could not suspend students for publishing and distributing
a satirical paper almost exclusively produced after school hours and off school property).
226. See Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 3. “A truly private life is already an illusion . . . . [High
school students seem] to have a high tolerance for what used to be personal information splashed in
the public square.” Id. at 5. Consider Casey Serin, who purchased eight houses in eight months,
looking to “fix ‘n’ flip,” only to end up in massive debt. Id. at 5. He detailed his bad investments
online. According to Serin,
Once you put something online, you really cannot take it back . . . . You’ve got to be
careful what you say – but once you say it, you’ve got to stand by it. And the only way
to repair it is to continue to talk, to explain myself, to see it through. If I shut down, I’m
at the mercy of what other people say.
Id. at 5. While this story may seem irrelevant to the subject matter, it is important for school
officials to get the point across to their students that they will be accountable for all material posted
online. According to Vic Walczak of the ACLU of Pennsylvania,
Kids have to understand there is a practical difference between playground/water-cooler
talk and posting something on the Internet . . . . When you post something on the
Internet, there can be REAL-WORLD consequences. Some of the stuff on the Internet is
mind-boggling . . . . While school officials may not legally be able to punish you, there
may be other real-life consequences that should give students pause about posting
something the whole world can see.
Hudson, Jr., supra note 5, at 24.
227. See supra Section II.
228. See id.
229. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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reached campus.230 Lower courts have traditionally upheld a student’s
constitutional right to speak such language.231
This Note cannot offer a perfect solution that would ensure that
school administrators know which speech they may punish and which
student speech has constitutionally protected interests. Nor may there be
a perfectly articulable checklist that the Supreme Court may establish to
offer school officials. Instead, this Note proposes that the High Court
create a more workable standard to offer some guidance in an emerging
area of law that has not been re-evaluated since the days of the Vietnam
War.232
230. See supra Part II.B.3.
231. Id.
232. See supra Section IV.C.
Some commentators believe that Judge Sotomayor’s appointment to the Supreme Court
may have harsh implications for the First Amendment:
Blogger Paul Levinson, a professor of communications and media studies at Fordham
University, has followed Avery’s case from the outset and believes that President Obama made a
mistake in nominating Sotomayor.
Posting of Steve Collins to BristolToday.com,
http://bristolnews.blogspot.com/2009/05/sotomayor-under-scrutiny-for-doninger.html (May 27,
2009, 16:37 EST). According to Levinson, “[l]ast time I checked, I thought our democracy and
freedom were predicated on the principle that all people have a right to express their opinions,
which must certainly include disrespect for authority.” Id. In declaring the First Amendment the
most primary Amendment for protection of freedoms, Levinson asked, “[i]sn’t performance on the
Appellate Court the best possible gauge of performance on the Supreme Court? Are not the stakes
on the Supreme Court just too high, too lasting, to take a chance on an Appellate judge with even
just one bad decision?” Why One Strike Against the First Amendment Should Rule Sotomayor Out
of the Supreme Court, http://paullevinson.blogspot.com/2009/05/why-one-strike-against-firstamendment.html (May 26, 2009) (using a baseball analogy to discuss how Sotomayor is not the best
person to appoint for the rest of her life to one of nine positions on a Supreme Court dominated by
Justices who narrowly interpret the First Amendment).
The National Coalition Against Censorship recognized that in the Doninger holding, the
Second Circuit was comprised of two conservative-leaning judges and Judge Sotomayor, who may
have been influenced by her right-leaning peers. Posting of Hannah Mueller to The National
Coalition Against Censorship, http://ncacblog.wordpress.com/2009/06/02/student-speech-underfire-under-sotomayor/ (June 2, 2009, 08:51 EST). However, “[f]rom what we’ve seen so far,
Sotomayor has done more to weaken First Amendment rights than to protect them.” Id.
Some commentators have used a statistical approach to argue that Sotomayor is not as
liberal as President Obama may have people believe. Posting of Zach Miners to Yahoo! News,
http://news.yahoo.com/s/usnews/wheredoesjudgesoniasotomayorstandonschoolissues (June 12,
2009, 15:49 EST). Perry Zirkel, a professor of education and law at Lehigh University, believes
that Sotomayor’s record suggests that she is conservative on education issues. Id. Zirkel’s analysis
showed that Sotomayor ruled in favor of school districts 83 percent of the time in decisions on
“regular education” and 58 percent of the time in decisions on special-education cases. Id.
Other commentators have not been so academic in their assessments. Sotomayor is
known as a dominating personality who is very tough during oral argument, leading blogger Alex
Knepper to wonder “whether the case would have been different had it been a young Latina girl
complaining about the cancellation of a cultural festival.” Sonia Sotomayor: Free Speech
Opponent?, http://race42008.com/2009/05/28/sonia-sotomayor-free-speech-opponent/ (May 28,
2009, 24:10 EST). Andy Thibault, whose Cool Justice Report has followed the Doninger case from
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the start, said that Sotomayor “was clubbed on the head with a crystal-clear free speech violation
and she said, in effect, ‘That’s nice, I’ll sign off on it.’ When a citizen seeks a redress of a
grievance and is punished for lobbying the community, that’s OK with Sotomayor.” Posting of
Steve Collins to BristolToday.com, http://bristolnews.blogspot.com/2009/05/sotomayor-underscrutiny-for-doninger.html (May 27, 2009, 16:37 EST).
Because this issue is so novel to the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, I
could not accurately predict how it would handle Avery’s case. Even under current Supreme Court
precedent, the First Amendment should protect a student’s right to call her school officials
“douchebags” or to lobby citizens for support, even if it is intended to “piss off” administrators.
Though Sotomayor endorsed the Doninger ruling by voting for it, she may not agree with every
detail and nuance of the opinion.
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